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Summary'
In 2006, Professor Juliet Stumpf at the Lewis and Clark Law School in 
Portland, Oregon coined the term “crimmigration”. In doing so, she gave a 
name to a legal development that had evolved in the United States since the 
mid-1980s. The term is a concatenation of ”criminal” and ”immigration”; 
suitable considering the legal field describes and highlights the merger of 
criminal and immigration law. To understand why this evolvement is 
remarkable you have to know the history of the two areas. Migration law used 
to be a primarily administrative civil process. Today, it is intertwined with 
criminal law, which is commonly thought of as an assigner of moral blame and 
with a particularly strong sanctioning regime as opposed to migration law that 
is primarily administrative. 
 
This essay examines if the trend of crimmigration can be connected to internal 
control of foreigners in the Swedish legislation (ch. 9 sec. 9 of the Aliens Act). 
The essay starts off with a summary of the most important features of the 
crimmigration field, and then compares these to their counterparts in the 
Swedish legislation with connection to internal control of foreigners. The 
author has used the traditional legal method as well as surveying preparatory 
works, government reports and studies discussing internal control of 
foreigners. 
 
The division between administrative law and criminal law is not as clear in the 
Swedish context as in the American context. However, one feature clearly 
separates the two fields: the view of the outcomes. Criminal punishment is 
regarded as repressive while administrative decisions, if materially correct, 
should be the ideal outcome for all parties. The law enforcement in the United 
States have historically not enforced immigration laws. In Sweden, the Police 
have always been active in migration control to various degrees. This is 
another difference between the two systems. 
 
Unauthorized stay on the territory has been a criminal offense for 90 years in 
Sweden but prosecution of immigration violations are unusual. This is another 
difference between the American and Swedish system. However, the 
criminalization of immigration violations can engage the Police not only in 
order to control migration but also to fight crime. This is a clear crimmigration-
feature of the Swedish system.  
 
For the last 20 years, internal control of foreigners have increasingly been 
described and used as a tool to control migration. This has in large been 
attributed to the accession of the Schengen Agreement as a compensatory 
measure. It has also been underlined as an important tool to fight crime and 
illegal immigration. 
 
There are aspects of the control that carry clear hallmarks of crimmigration. 
The fact that unauthorized presence is criminalized is one, opening up for the 
criminal sphere to intervene. Another hallmark is that the controls are meant to 
hinder both unauthorized immigration as well as crime. A third is that the 
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administrative nature of the controls lessens the scrutiny given to the tools used 
to carry out the controls, despite their clear resemblance with their investigative 
counterparts. 
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Sammanfattning'
År 2006 myntade Professor Juliet Stumpf vid Lewis and Clark Law School i 
Oregon i USA begreppet ”crimmigration”. När hon gjorde det, döpte hon 
också en juridisk utveckling som startade i mitten av 1980-talet i USA. 
Begreppet är en sammanslagning av orden ”criminal” och ”immigration” 
vilket är passande eftersom begreppet beskriver och uppmärksammar 
sammanslagningen av straffrätt och migrationsrätt. För att förstå varför den 
här utvecklingen är uppseendeväckande behöver man känna till de två 
juridiska fältens historia. Migrationsrätt har alltid ansetts vara först och främst 
en förvaltningsrättslig process. Straffrätten å sin sida är intimt 
sammankopplat med uttryck för moralisk förkastlighet och en särskilt stark 
sanktionsregim. Idag är dock migrationsrätt och straffrätt allt mer 
sammanvävt.  
 
Denna uppsats undersöker huruvida utvecklingen av ”crimmigration” kan 
kopplas till inre utlänningskontroll i den svenska lagstiftningen (9:9 
Utlänningslagen). I det första kapitlet finns en genomgång av de viktigaste 
dragen i ”crimmigration”-forskningen, vilka sedan jämförs med 
motsvarigheterna i den svenska lagstiftningen som relaterar till inre 
utlänningskontroll. Författaren har använt sig av traditionell juridisk metod 
men även gått igenom förarbeten, SOU:er  och studier som diskuterat inre 
utlänningskontroll. 
 
Uppdelningen i svensk rätt mellan förvaltningsrätt och straffrätt inte varit lika 
tydlig som i det amerikanska systemet. Det finns dock en signifikant skillnad 
som skiljer systemen åt: hur man ser på effekten av de båda systemen. Straff 
anses i grunden vara repressivt.  Beslut från förvaltningsrätten anses ”ideala” 
för båda parter om det materiellt riktiga beslutet fattats. Historiskt sett har 
polisen inte verkställt migrationsärenden i USA, medan polisen i Sverige 
alltid har varit aktiv på olika sätt i migrationskontrollen. Detta är ytterligare 
en skillnad mellan de två systemen.  
 
Olovlig vistelse har varit ett brott i svensk lagstiftning i 90 år men åtal för 
brott mot utlänningslagen är ovanligt. Detta är ytterligare en skillnad mot det 
amerikanska systemet. Det ska dock noteras att kriminalisering av 
migrationsrättsöverträdelser tillåter att polisen arbetar brottsbekämpande mot 
dessa företeelser, och inte bara i migrationskontrollerande roll. Detta är ett 
tydligt ”crimmigration”-drag i det svenska systemet.  
 
De senaste 20 åren har inre utlänningskontroll blivit allt mer politiskt 
uppmärksammat. Detta har i mångt och mycket förklarats med att Sverige 
tillträtt Schengenavtalet och det då har behövts som en kompensatorisk 
åtgärd.  Inre utlänningskontroll har också förklarats vara ett viktigt verktyg 
för att bekämpa brott och illegal invandring. 
 
Det finns aspekter av den inre utlänningskontrollen som bär kännetecken av 
”crimmigration”. Det faktum att olovlig vistelse är kriminaliserat är ett, vilket 
öppnar upp för att straffrättsligt agera mot migrationsrättsöverträdelser. Ett 
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annat kännetecken är att kontrollerna ska hindra både brott och invandring. 
Ett tredje kännetecken är att rättssäkerhet diskuteras i mindre utsträckning 
gällande de verktyg och tvångsmedel som används i samband med kontrollen 
på grund av kontrollens uppfattade förvaltningsrättsliga natur.   
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Abbreviations'
Ch.  Chapter 
  
INS  Immigration and Naturalization Service 
 
ICE   Immigration and Customs Enforcement  
 
IoG  Instrument of Government (Regeringsformen) (SFS 1974:152) 
 
ECHR  European Court of Human Rights 
 
EU  European Union 
 
FUK  Decree on Preliminary Investigations    
  (Förundersökningskungörelsen) (SFS 1947:948) 
 
JO  Parliamentary Ombudsman (Justitieombudsman) 
 
NJA  Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 
 
Para.  Paragraph 
 
Prop.  Proposition  
 
RB  Code Of Judicial Procedure (Rättegångsbalken) (SFS  
  1942:740)  
 
Sec.  Section 
 
SFS  Svensk Författningssamling 
 
SIV  The Immigration Authority (Statens Invandrarverk) 
 
SOU  Statens Offentliga Utredningar 
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1' Introduction''
1.1' Background'
In 2006, professor Juliet Stumpf at the Lewis and Clark Law School in 
Portland, Oregon coined the term ‘crimmigration’1. In doing so, she gave a 
name to a legal development that had evolved in the United States since the 
mid-1980s. The term is a concatenation of ”criminal” and ”immigration”; 
suitable considering the legal field describes and highlights the merger of 
criminal and immigration law. To understand why this evolvement is 
remarkable you have to know the history of the two areas. Migration law used 
to be a primarily administrative civil process.2 Today, it is intertwined with 
criminal law, which is commonly thought of as an assigner of moral blame 
and with a particularly strong sanctioning regime as opposed to migration law 
that is primarily administrative.3 
 
In her 2006 article, Stumpf pinpointed three areas of the law where this trend 
was particularly visible: “(1) the substance of the law where immigration law 
and criminal law increasingly overlaps, (2) immigration enforcement has 
come to resemble criminal law enforcement, and (3) the procedural aspects of 
prosecuting immigration have taken on many of the earmarks of criminal 
procedure”.4 This article was the first attempt of many in trying to survey, 
explain, and discuss the consequences of this development. 
 
In a different part of the world, Sweden, in 2009 the Police Authority, The 
Migration Board and The Swedish Prison and Probation Service all received 
the same assignment in their respective appropriation directions 
(regleringsbrev): together they were to review the procedure for enforcement 
of removal decisions. When the review was done, they were to institute the 
necessary measures in order to increase the enforcement rate.5  One of the 
outcomes of this was “REVA”, (Rättssäkert och Effektivt 
Verkställighetsarbete), which stands for Legally Secure and Efficient 
Enforcement. REVA received a lot of media attention, and was, somewhat 
wrongfully, understood as internal control of foreigners6.7  
                                               
1 She did this in her article ”The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign 
Power” (2006). 
2 STUMPF 2006 p. 381. 
3 STUMPF 2006 p. 411. 
4 STUMPF 2006 p. 381. 
5 ”Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2009 avseende Migrationsverket” Ju2008/942/SIM ch. 3; 
”Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2009 avseende Rikspolisstyrelsen och övriga myndigheter 
inom polisorganisationen, Ju2008/8581/PO ch. 3; ”Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2009 
avseende Kriminalvården” Ju2008/10579/KRIM ch. 3. 
6 Inre utlänningskontroll ch. 9, sec. 9 of The Aliens Act. 
7 In the project description of REVA internal control of foreigners was never mentioned. 
Instead, REVA streamlined and laid down rules for co-operation between different 
authorities in order to enhance the number of enforced removals. However, in practice, an 
increase in the number of controls increases the number of apprehensions of immigrants 
facing removals, thus resulting in an upsurge of removals. The connection between REVA 
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The REVA-project received massive criticism, mainly for being 
discriminatory and for profiling people who looked foreign, despite being 
Swedish citizens.8 The Head of the National Police Board’s Border Control 
Unit Sören Clemerton described how police officers were questioned when 
carrying out identity checks and that this was problematic: He further stated: 
“We have an obligation to perform controls. It has to do with crime fighting 
and internal security”.9  
 
Can crimmigration and REVA be part of the same trend? 
1.2' Purpose'
The purpose of this essay is not to answer a set legal question. It is instead 
intended to discuss, highlight and survey what the field of ”crimmigration” 
can bring to the Swedish legal context, and more specifically, in relation to 
the practice of internal control of foreigners. I do not intend to answer the 
question whether or not the practices are discriminatory even though I will 
touch upon that. Instead: Through the lens of crimmigration I will look at the 
convergence of administrative law and criminal law in the field of internal 
migration control. How do the legal areas interact in the case of internal 
control of foreigners? Can crimmigration add something to the discussion 
concerning migration law and criminal law in Sweden? Is internal control of 
foreigners an example of this trend? Has it changed in the past 20 years?  
 
In my work with this essay, piece by piece, I have aimed at piecing together a 
puzzle of the different parts of internal immigration control. With my 
crimmigration-glasses on, focus has been on the intersection of criminal and 
administrative law and how it is exemplified in the actors and the tools used 
to carry out the controls. I aim to look at the legal development to see if it 
resembles what American scholars have noted concerning relaxed procedural 
safeguards and administrative law connected to criminal law.  
 
1.3' Research'question'
I have two main research questions: 
 
!' Is internal control of foreigners an example of the trend of 
“crimmigration”?  
!' What can the crimmigration-literature bring to the Swedish discussion 
on internal control of foreigners?  
 
To answer these questions I will focus on the following aspects: 
                                                                                                                          
and internal control of foreigners is not explicit, but they are interlinked.  See Peter Leander 
“Skyldig till motsatsen bevisats” Aréna Idé 2014.  
8  CANTWELL 2014; HASSEN KHEMIRI 2013.  
9 ORRE 2013. 
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o' How has the legal evolvement been of internal control of 
foreigners for the past 20 years? What is the explanation for 
this development? 
o' How do criminal law and migration law interact when looking 
at internal control of foreigners? 
o' What actors and tools are used for internal control of 
foreigners? How are they to be understood in the 
criminal/administrative divide? Does enforcement of 
immigration law rely on the criminal justice system? 
o' How are procedural safeguards and legal principles affected 
depending on the legal area and how is this played out it in 
relation to citizens and non-citizens? 
 
I hope my essay deepens the conversation about internal control of foreigners, 
and instead of only focusing on the question of discrimination, place it in a 
continuum of migration control. I hope to review to what extent it relies on 
both on the administrative sphere and the criminal sphere.  Specifically, I 
hope to survey how internal control of foreigners has adverse effects on 
undocumented immigrants and those perceived as “immigrants” both in the 
criminal sphere and the administrative. Furthermore, I hope the essay will  
1.4' Method'and'theory'
1.4.1' Method'and'material'
1.4.1.1' The'traditional'legal'method'
To determine the content of the law I will use the traditional legal method.  
Sweden has a civil law legal system, even if elements of the common law 
tradition can be found as well. This is evident in the traditional legal method. 
This method interprets what is the valid law through categorization of legal 
sources. The legal sources of importance in the Swedish legal system are law, 
preparatory works, case law and doctrine. 10  It generally follows this 
hierarchy. This means, that if case law and doctrine interpret the law 
differently, case law weighs greater. Case law from the European Court of 
Human Rights and European Court of Justice is also legally binding for the 
courts in Sweden.11 
  
1.4.1.2' Preparatory'works'and'government'reports'
To understand how internal control of foreigners has been discussed and 
interpreted I have looked at preparatory works. I have gone through the 22 
preparatory works that mention “internal control of foreigners” between 1971 
and 2014. I shall not provide a systematic presentation of the preliminary 
works, instead relevant issues will be brought up in relation to the discussed 
phenomena. I have also looked at Government reports where internal control 
of foreigners has been discussed at length. This is done in order to see if there 
                                               
10 KLEINEMAN 2013 p. 21.  
11 BERNITZ AND KJELLGREN pp. 147 – 150.  
 10 
has been different understandings of the control, proposals for legislative 
change and how these have been received.   
I have chosen preparatory works because they express the legislator’s wish 
and also reflect the public discourse. Reading them offers a comprehensive 
understanding of the development of internal control of foreigners throughout 
the years as well as how they relate to relevant actors and tools. I also look at 
government reports that have touched on the subject of internal control of 
foreigners at slightly greater length. The government reports I focus on are 
SOU 1997:159 “An Enlarged European Union with freedom, security and 
justice”12, SOU 1997:128 “Enforcement and control in alien cases”13, SOU 
2004:110 “Border Control Act – a more efficient border control”14 and SOU 
2002:69 “Human smuggling and victims of human trafficking”.15 
 
1.4.1.3' Other'relevant'documents'for'internal'control'of'
foreigners'
In order to answer my research question on how immigration and criminal 
law interact when looking at internal control of foreigners, I have examined 
those documents that regulate the implementation of the controls. I have also 
looked at studies and reports concerning internal control of foreigners to see 
if there are ”crimmigration”-aspects that are not captured just by using the 
traditional legal method.  
 
In doing so there are four sources I refer to continuously. The first worth 
mentioning is the instructions on how internal control of foreigners are to be 
implemented from the National Police Board, RPSFS 2011:4 FAP 273-1.16 
The second source is Sophia Hydén and Anna Lundberg’s dissertation 
Internal control of foreigners in Police work – between the rule of law and 
efficenciy in Sweden’s Schengen17 (2004). The third source is the supervision 
report conducted by the the National Police Board on the internal control of 
foreigners in 2013. This resulted in Tillsynsrapport 2014:1418. The last one I 
will mention is a report from Aréna Idé, a progressive think thank, that looked 
at the practice and routine of the controls in “Guilty until the opposite is 
proven – an examination of the Police’s internal control of foreigners”19. 
                                               
12 SOU 1997:159 ”Ett utvidgat europeiskt område med FRIHET, SÄKERHET och 
RÄTTVISA”. 
13 SOU 1997:128 ”Verkställighet och kontroll i utlänningsärenden”. 
14 SOU 2004:110 ”Gränskontrollag – effektivare gränskontroll”. 
15 SOU 2002:69 ”Människosmuggling och offer för människohandel”. 
16 This can be found in National Police Board Statutes Book. It replaced the instructions from 
1986, RPSFS 1986:3, FAP 273-1. 
17 Inre utlänningskontroll i polisarbete: mellan rättsstatsideal och effektivitet i Schengens 
Sverige, Malmö University Press 
18 Tillsynsrapport 2014:14 "Inre Utlänningskontroll” 
19 Peter Leander “Skyldig till motsatsen bevisats – En granskning av polisens inre 
utlänningskontroller” (2014) Aréna Idé.  
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1.4.1.4' Crimmigration'literature'
Juliet Stumpf coined the term “crimmigration” in 2006. However, there were 
earlier scholars who had noted the merger of migration law and criminal.20 
There are a number of certain texts in the crimmigration-literature commonly 
referred to that constitute the foundation of this research. I focus on the 
scholars who identify crimmigration or agree on the foundations of this 
system as a phenomenon worth highlighting and discussing, but I also discuss 
articles I deem particularly yielding for my topic. I do not intend to give a 
fully comprehensive picture of the field of crimmigration. 
 
 In this essay I have chosen to focus only on articles from American 
scholars.21  There are two main reasons for this decision.  
 The first reason is that I wish to go “back to basics” with this essay. 
Articles and books written on crimmigration in Europe are very interesting 
and they greatly contribute to the conversation surrounding migration policies 
in Europe. They have adapted crimmigration to a European setting. However, 
there is no previous literature concerning crimmigration in Sweden. Therefore 
I use the American literature, especially the early articles, to give the reader a 
background to Swedish law in order to understand the context correctly. 
Through this I hope to give the reader a basic understanding of both 
crimmigration as a field and crimmigration in Sweden. 
 The second reason is because I think the history of migration policy in 
the United States make the US system a relevant example to look at and learn 
from for Sweden. The United States has long been described as “a country of 
immigrants”. However, it also has a long history of excluding large amounts 
of people on racially charged grounds, which started in mid 1800s. 22 
Immigration has long been a highly debated topic with strong advocates 
speaking for undocumented migrants. In 2014, there were an estimated 11.4 
million undocumented persons in the United States, of a population of around 
300 million. Undocumented immigrants make up 5,1 % of the workforce. 
One example of the advocacy of migrant groups is that in 1986, Congress 
passed a law that legalized the status of 2,7 million migrants.23 In Sweden, 
undocumented immigration historically has been very low compared to other 
developed countries.24 However, Sweden is now facing a new reality with a 
growing number of asylum seekers and irregular migrants. In May 2014, the 
Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter publicized a number of stories on the 
growing number of unauthorized workers that is the new underclass in 
Swedish society.25  The changes will put the Swedish migration policy to a 
test and change it drastically, and I hope the American legislative path can 
function as a warning clock for Swedish legislators as well. 
 
                                               
20 The most commonly referred author is Daniel Kanstroom “Criminalizing the 
Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th: ”Pale of Law’”  
21 There are interesting work emerging on the subject from the European arena as well. See 
for example Ylva Kramo “The European Union’s response to Irregular Migration and The 
Problem of Criminalisation” [2014] 5 New Journal of European Criminal Law 26 
22 GARCÍA p.1457. 
23 KROGSTAD and PASSEL 2015. 
24 HAMMAR p.187. 
25 ORRENIUS and SKÖLD 2015. 
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Therefore, I compare the American and Swedish systems. I go through the 
relevant aspects in the American system and compare this to the Swedish 
counterpart.  
 
In chapter 2, my research chapter, I go through crimmigration at length. 
1.5' Previous'research'
There has not been much written about internal control of foreigners in the 
Swedish context. The most important work is the dissertation by Sophia 
Hydén and Anna Lundberg: Inre utlänningskontroll i polisarbete: mellan 
rättsstatsideal och effektivitet i Schengens Sverige (2004). The dissertation 
deals with internal control of foreigner in light of Sweden joining the 
operational part of the Schengen agreement. It discusses how efficiency and 
the ideal of rule of law might conflict in the example of internal control of 
foreigners.  
 
Crimmigration is a new field of research, so far mainly conducted in the 
United States. The major works are Juliet Stumpf “The Crimmigration Crisis: 
Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power'” (2006), Daniel Kanstroom 
“Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 
11th: ‘Pale of Law’” (2004), Ingrid Eagly, “Prosecuting Immigration” 
(2010) and Jennifer M Chacón, “Overcriminalizing Immigration”. (2012) 
 
Maria João Guia, Maartje van der Woude, and Joanne van der Leun are the 
editors of the book Social Control and Justice: Crimmigration in the Age of 
Fear (2013). They have gathered a number of scholars that take a 
transnational approach to the crimmigration field. In the book, commonalities 
and dissimilarities are highlighted while the joining force of crimmigration is 
identified: the fear of the poorer and racially darker immigrant.   
1.6' Delimitations''
I will not go in to the creation of the ”illegal” immigrant and the securitized 
development of Swedish migration. Not because it is not important, but 
because it has been discussed earlier.26 
 
I will not cover the control of foreigners in connection to shipping that is 
performed by the Swedish Coast Guard. I also will no go through special 
control of foreigners, regulated in Lag (1991:572) om särskild 
utlänningskontroll. 
 
There is crimmigration-literature from the European setting. I have however 
chosen to focus on the literature from the United States; especially the early 
articles. Crimmigration has not been discussed before in Sweden, why I have 
limited this essay to the ”original” understanding of crimmigration. 
                                               
26 See for example Elisabeth Abiri, ”The Securitisation of Migration – Towards an 
Understanding of Migration Policy Changes in the 1990s The Case of Sweden” (2000) 
Department of Peace and Development Research at Göteborgs University. 
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In the crimmigration literature, much focus is devoted to 1) increased use of 
deportation as a criminal punishment, and 2) the increased use of detention. I 
do cover these parts in chapter 2. However, I do not discuss this in the 
Swedish legislation.27 No matter how interesting, there is just not time or 
space enough to go through these aspects. Instead I have focused on internal 
control of foreigners and aspects more relevant to that. 
1.7' Structure'
In ch. 2 I explain the theory of crimmigration and highlight the most 
interesting aspects for my essay. In crimmigration, the understanding of a 
divide between administrative law and a criminal law is important, why I 
devote ch. 3 to establish whether or not there is a criminal/administrative 
divide as seen in the American legislation. I will then look at the actor in 
question, the Police Authority, and see if they have become more or less 
active in migration control then before in ch. 4. Following that, in chapter 5, I 
will go through what Stumpf call the “substance of the law”, and I will focus 
on criminalization of immigration violations. Crimmigration-scholars have 
noted how procedural safeguards are negatively affected by crimmigration, 
and I will spend some time on applicable legal principles chapter 6.  
 After the first five chapters I will direct my attention to internal 
control of foreigners. I will start in ch. 7 to cover the political explanation for 
the intensification of the controls that has happened for the last twenty years. 
In ch. 8 I go through the content of the law and how it has been interpreted. In 
ch. 9 I look at the tools used in connection to the controls. I finish the essay 
with a short summary where I try to answer my overarching research 
questions. 
 I will not have one separate analysis in the end, but instead analyze 
continuously throughout the essay, and comment on how different 
phenomenon relate to crimmigration. 
1.7.1' Translation'and'language'
Except for the Instrument of Government, there are no official translations of 
the Swedish statutes. I have translated the relevant provisions to the best of 
my ability and when there have been unofficial translations; I have used these 
unless they have been outdated. For the Swedish reader I have attached the 
original text in those instances where I think the choice of words is of greater 
importance. The names of authorities and statutes come from the ”Glossary 
for the Courts of Sweden” distributed by the Swedish National Courts 
Administration.28  
 
                                               
27 For the interested reader there is a dissertation about deportation as punishment by Lisa 
Westfelt “Migration som straff?: Utvisning på grund av brott 1973 – 2003 med fokus på 
flyktingskydd” (2008) Stockholms Universitet.  
28 Domstolsverket (2014) available at <http://www.domstol.se/publikationer/ordlista/svensk-
engelsk_ordlista.pdf>.  
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When legal Swedish terms are used the original term is in brackets directly 
after the term. The titles of preparatory works, books and reports are 
translated in the text in those instances when they are mentioned. The original 
is then added in a footnote. The essay is written in American English.  
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2' Crimmigration'
In 2006, Juliet Stumpf published the article “The Crimmigration Crisis: 
Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power”. In this article she coined the term 
crimmigration as an umbrella term for the merger of criminal law and 
immigration law or, as she would say “the intertwinement of crime control 
and migration control”.29 
 Stumpf starts her article with an imagined letter to the future president 
of the United States dated January 2017. Her letter describes the many 
challenges facing the country, challenges that all can be attributed to the 
“crimmigration”-crisis. She writes that a dramatic increase in the prison 
population has led to prison riots. Non-citizens are being deported for any 
criminal conviction, no matter how minor offense. Border security is 
enhanced to the point where foreigners applying for VISA’s are drastically 
reduced.  
 The letter is not real. But the changes she describes up to that point is. 
From the 1980s an onwards, more and more immigrants have been deported 
for minor criminal offences in the United State. This includes legal permanent 
residents as well as undocumented migrants.30 The majority of the cases in 
the federal justice system now enforce prosecution of immigration 
violations.31  
2.1' Background'
To understand why the intertwinement of immigration law and criminal law 
has attracted so much attention and discussion amongst legal scholars in the 
United States, you have to understand the history.  
 In the United States, there are two broad categories of law: criminal 
law and civil law. Immigration proceedings have been regarded as a civil 
administrative matter.  Admission or exclusion from the national territory has 
been seen as the power to bestow a benefit, thus making it an administrative 
matter.32 Furthermore, The US Supreme Court has said that deportation is not 
to be seen as a criminal punishment, thus belonging to civil law. This also 
meant that procedural safeguards guaranteed in criminal proceedings are not 
applicable in immigration proceedings about removal.33 The only procedural 
                                               
29 GARCÍA p. 1457. 
30 STUMPF 2006 p. 408. 
31 SKLANSKY p. 173. 
32 For the rest of the essay I will only use the word administrative and not civil in order to not 
confuse the reader. In the Swedish legislation, civil law (civilrätt) and administrative law 
(förvaltningsrätt) are two separate areas of law. To read more on the criminal/civil divide 
immigration proceedings in the American legislation see Peter L. Markowitz “Straddling the 
Civil-Criminal Divide: a Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration 
Removal Proceedings” (2008) 43 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 289. 
33 The first case to establish that deportation is not punishment was Fong Yue Ting v. The 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, (1893) and has since been confirmed multiple times. E.g. in 
Neguise v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, (2009) when the Supreme Court quoted Fong Yue Ting. 
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safeguard offered is due process, and only when you are inside the country’s 
territory.34 
 Not only have criminal law and immigration law been part of different 
realms of law. It has also been under the strict governance of the federal 
government. This is because immigration policy has been regarded as part of 
foreign policy.35 The importance of acting as one sovereign country in the 
area of immigration has been motivated with concerns for international 
relations, thus tying it to the federal government.36 This was confirmed and 
sustained by the plenary power doctrine, which meant that courts deferred to 
what Congress and the Executive had decided in the arena of immigration. 
This in turn lead to jurisprudence from the Supreme Court prohibiting states 
from using both criminal and civil law that discriminated based on alienage.37 
The result was that only the federal government could distinguish between 
citizens and non-citizens and who had the power to decide who could enter 
and who were to be removed from the territory.  
 The result was a system where immigration policy has been an 
administrative federal matter. It invokes very few procedural safeguards as 
opposed to criminal law, which has been primarily a state matter, filled with 
constitutional protection.38 This divide held sway for almost 100 years.39 
2.2' Crimmigration'today'
In Stumpf’s article, she points to three areas of the law where the two fields 
have merged. First, the substance of immigration law and criminal law that 
increasingly overlaps. Second, in the area of enforcement where immigration 
enforcement is almost undistinguishable from criminal law enforcement. 
Third, the procedural aspects of prosecuting immigration violations have 
taken on many of the earmarks of criminal procedure.  
 Not all of the scholars following in her footsteps have adhered to this 
exact classification, but they all agree on the main points. After her article 
there has been a range of articles further exploring the subject. I will not have 
time to go into all of the aspects brought up but I will try to give an overview 
following Stumpf’s division. In the essay I will cover the most important 
aspects relevant for my essay throughout the different chapters. 
2.2.1' Substance'of'the'law'
The change in the substance of the law recognized in the crimmigration-
literature consists of two types of legislative changes.40 The first one is the 
expansion of criminal offences that render you removable if you are a non-
citizen. As Legomsky calls it: “deportation as a tool of crime control”.41 Since 
                                               
34 STUMPF 2008 p. 1572. 
35 STUMPF 2006 p. 379. 
36 STUMPF 2008 p. 1573. 
37 STUMPF 2008 p. 1574. 
38 STUMPF 2008 p. 1572, 1574, 1587. 
39 STUMPF 2008 p. 1581. 
40 See for example STUMPF 2006 pp. 381 – 86; GARCÍA p. 1468 – 1475; SKLANSKY pp. 
164 – 181.  
41 SKLANSKY p. 175. 
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the 1980’s, crime-based removal has expanded drastically. Today a one-year 
sentence for a “crime of violence” or theft can leave you deportable.42 An 
estimated 20 % of the deportees due to criminal convictions have been lawful 
residents, some for over ten and twenty years.43 
 The second change is the criminalization of immigration violations. 
As Stumpf puts it: “actions by immigrants that were previously civil 
violations have crossed the boundary to become criminal offences, or have 
become harsher criminal penalties with heightened enforcement”.44 Examples 
of violations that today are considered criminal offences are hiring 
undocumented workers or marrying to obtain legal status. To unlawfully re-
enter the United States may give up to twenty years in prison. 45  The 
prosecution of people unlawfully entering the United States is a major part of 
what federal criminal justice system is dealing with today.46 This was not the 
case in the United States earlier: in 1918, the Supreme Court said that the 
remedy for violating the immigration rules were deportation, not 
punishment.47 
 In my essay, I focus on the latter of these changes in the Swedish 
context.  
2.2.2' Law'enforcement''
The second change noted by Stumpf is the change of law enforcement. 
Sklansky writes “immigration enforcement has made growing use of the tools 
and techniques of criminal law enforcement”.48 One kind of “tool” is the 
agencies meant to enforce immigration law.  A telling example of the 
evolvement is that of the Border Patrol. The Border Patrol used to only 
operate at the border and had no right to apprehend or arrest without a 
warrant.49 Today, it is trained as any law enforcement agency with the right to 
detain, arrest and make stops.50 
 
Not only have immigration control agencies become more like law 
enforcement, but local and state law enforcements are now acting as 
immigration agencies as well. Historically, enforcement of immigration law 
has been a federal matter for federal agencies, such as the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS).51 In 1996, Congress authorized state and local 
police to arrest and detain individuals in breach of certain immigration 
violations.52 In 2002, the Department of Justice stated that local and state law 
enforcement have the “inherent authority” to enforce both criminal and 
administrative federal immigration laws.53 Even if this interpretation may be 
                                               
42 STUMPF 2006 p. 384. 
43 MCLEOD pp. 107 - 108. 
44 STUMPF 2006 p. 384.  
45 STUMPF 2006 p. 384.  
46 SKLANSKY p. 173. 
47 EAGLY p. 1297. 
48 SKLANSKY p. 181. 
49 STUMPF 2006 p. 387. 
50 STUMPF 2006 p. 388. 
51 WISHNIE p. 1087. 
52 WISHNIE p. 1093. 
53 WISHNIE p. 1091. 
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incorrect (it is being contested by for example Michael Wishnie, professor at 
New York University54), law enforcement agencies are now active players in 
migration control. Another noted feature is that law enforcement agencies 
now share information with immigration enforcement agencies in order to 
find those breaking immigration laws or who are undocumented.55 
 This process started before the terrorist attacks of 2001, but it clearly 
accelerated thereafter. The terror attacks moved the issue of ‘national 
security’ from outside to inside of state territory. Immigration policy then 
went from being connected with foreign affairs to becoming a national 
problem.56 Following this change, state and police forces were expected to 
join the fight against terrorism. The efforts were mainly directed at non-
citizens, especially from Arab countries. With little political power it was an 
easy target.57 Responsibility for immigration control was moved from the 
Department of Justice in 2002 to the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), which clearly illustrates how the perception of migration policy has 
changed.58 
 
Directive from the federal government has not been the only force driving the 
process of further state involvement. States have also, sometimes against the 
wishes of the federal government, created their own set of immigration laws. 
The most well known example is Arizona’s legislative proposal “SB 1070”59. 
Arizona tried to target “illegal immigration” and adopted a number of 
measures. One of the most criticized was the requirement for all police 
officers to run immigration checks on everyone they stop if they have 
“reasonable suspicion” that the person lacks legal status.60 
 One reason why policy proposals on breaking down on immigration 
have been criticized is the high number of undocumented immigrants living 
in the United States. An estimated 11,4 million of the inhabitants lack legal 
status, a high number considering that the United States have an estimated 
300 million inhabitants.  
 Criticism towards allowing and requiring local police to enforce 
migration laws has been broad. It is said to deter undocumented migrants 
from reporting crime. Furthermore, it will divert local police’s resources.61 
Pro-immigration organizations have stated that the effort will increase racial 
profiling and discourage noncitizens from accessing school, hospital and 
other local services.62 Allegra McLeod, Professor at Georgetown Law Center 
has criticized the development because it misguides crime control. A person 
will be approached by law enforcement not because he or she is of interest 
                                               
54 Wishnie, ”State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws” (2004). 
55 A majority of arrestees in the country have their identifying information checked against 
the Department of Homeland Security’s database to see if the arrestee is breaking 
immigration laws, Chacón p. 645; Garcia p. 1457; another example concerns the FBI’s 
database. INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) started in 2001 to add immigration 
violators into the FBI database so the FBI could instruct and advise local law enforcement to 
conduct immigration arrests, Wishnie p. 1086. 
56 STUMPF 2008 p. 1594. 
57 KANSTROOM p. 642. 
58 STUMPF 2008 p. 1595. 
59 ”Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” Arizona Senate Bill 1070. 
60 SKLANSKY p.188; GARCÍA p. 1747. 
61 WISHNIE p. 1087. 
62 WISHNIE p.1088. 
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criminally, but because of a potential immigration interest. The Police officer 
then knows that he or she is to focus on immigrants because this is the way 
the state has resolved their migration control policy, not because the 
individual pose a danger to the public. 63  
2.2.3' Procedural'aspects'
2.2.3.1' Immigration'proceedings''
Immigration law and procedure have become more punitive but procedural 
safeguards are not guaranteed in immigration proceedings as they are in 
criminal proceedings.64   This is shown in crimmigration research. Criminal 
law contains multiple procedural safeguards in order to ensure that the 
accused has sufficient legal protection. Daniel Kanstroom, Professor of Law 
as Boston College Law School, exemplifies the difference for a non-citizen 
violating an immigration law in the example of arrest: 
 
 “As to the arrest, his rights will be minimal. He will be very unlikely 
to argue for suppression of evidence that may have been seized in 
violation the Fourth Amendment. He will not be read his Miranda 
rights. Indeed, he may not even be advised that he has the right to 
obtain a lawyer until after a government agent has interrogated him. 
He will never have the right to an appointed counsel. He will, of 
course, never have a right to a jury trial.”65 
 
The most obvious comparison that can be made to criminal law in the 
immigration sphere is the massive increase of the use of detention for 
immigrants. For example, the majority of the people deported are detained 
before removal. 66   
 Detention is acceptable both in criminal investigations and while an 
immigration case is pending. However, the use of criminal detention depends 
on the circumstances of the case and the defendant. In immigration cases 
mandatory detention is prescribed for a large number of immigration 
violations. The detention can also be indefinite.67 In 2009, 95 % of the people 
guilty of immigration crimes were detained when arrested.68  
 
2.2.3.2' Criminal'proceedings''
Criminalizing of immigration violation is not merely a legislatively change, it 
is also carried out through prosecutions in the criminal system. The massive 
increase of prosecution of immigration violations is a key component of the 
crimmigration-nexus. Prosecution of immigration violations is more common 
than drug- and weapon prosecutions in the federal justice system.69 McLeod 
                                               
63 MCLEOD pp. 147 – 150. 
64 LEGOMSKY p. 472 
65 KANSTROOM p. 650. 
66 GARCÍA p. 1480. 
67 LEGOMSKY pp. 490 – 492. 
68 CHACÓN p. 632. 
69 MCLEOD p. 114. 
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has criticized this trend, because prosecuting immigration violations is costly 
and unnecessary because most immigrants will be deported anyway.70 
 
Ingrid Eagly, professor of law at UCLA Law School, argues that the criminal 
system and its accompanying rights, procedure and systems have been 
affected by interaction with the civil system of immigration.71 One example 
of this is “Operation Streamline” launched in 2005. It is a federal initiative 
meant to streamline the large number of federal prosecutions of immigration 
violations. Despite the adjudication of criminal matters, the initiative allows 
the less rigid procedural safeguards used in immigration proceedings. The 
court can now settle  “immigration cases en masse”; meaning that up to 100 
defendants can show up in front of the judge at the same time and be rushed 
through the system. Often they share a legal counsel with many other 
immigrants and it is not clear if they understand what is happening.72  
 Ingrid Eagly shows in her research how detention without bond, 
interrogation without Miranda and arrest without probable cause are other 
outcomes of the interaction of migration and criminal law. 73  She further 
elaborates on the effect crimmigration has had on the exclusionary rule.  
“The exclusionary rule’s power to suppress evidence that is illegally 
obtained is considered to be one of the most important restraints n 
police behavior.  However, in the immigration sphere, suppression 
based on the exclusionary rule becomes an available remedy only 
upon heightened showing of an “egregious” or “widespread” 
violation”. 74 
 
The use of criminal techniques and tools without adequate procedural 
safeguards lead to consequences in the immigration sphere. Evidence that 
would have been dismissed in a criminal case is accepted in the immigration 
sphere. 
2.2.4' A'two^tiered'system'based'on'citizenship'
All of these changes, in legislation, law enforcement and procedure have 
created a new branch of immigration law, and/or criminal law. The most 
apparent feature is that it is almost exclusively75 applicable to non-citizens.76 
Law Professors Sharryn Aiken, David Lyon and Malcolm Thorburn 
summarized the situation this way: 
 
“As a result, it is no great exaggeration to say that there are now two 
criminal laws at work: one for non-citizens (which includes a host of 
immigration offences that do not apply to citizens, as well as 
deportation as a further response to crime to which citizens are not 
                                               
70 MCLEOD pp. 147 – 150. 
71 EAGLY p. 1284. 
72 GARCÍA p. 1476. 
73 EAGLY p. 1288. 
74 EAGLY p. 1316. 
75 With the exception of criminal sanctions directed at e.g. employers of undocumented 
migrants or marrying a noncitizen to evade immigration laws. 
76 BECKETT and EVANS p. 246. 
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liable) and another for citizens (who are subject neither to these 
additional offences nor these additional responses to crime).”77 
2.3' Interesting'aspects'
In the section above I have tried at giving an overview of the field of 
“crimmigration”. I will now go into some aspects that are particularly 
interesting for my essay. 
2.3.1' Criminal'law'
First, I will go through the special status criminal law has in crimmigration 
literature and in society. Historically, criminalization has had different 
objectives and functions. Scholars today generally agree that the general 
prevention is the overall aim of criminalization, but that it still includes 
retaliation in some form. The preventive effect is partly obtained through 
enforcement; if it is enforced regularly individuals will be deterred from 
committing a particular offense.78  It also has a moral-forming and habit-
forming function.79 Furthermore, it has a declaratory and expressive function 
of the law; there is no more obvious way for the state to deem an act morally 
wrong than to criminalize it.80 This view plays a big part in crimmigration 
literature. The principle ultima ratio is also important: criminal law as the last 
resort.81  
 In the crimmigration literature, criminal law is seen as something 
different from other areas of law. Stumpf attributes this view to “the 
expressive function of punishment”, meaning that criminalization is society’s 
way of morally condemning a certain behavior.82 In Ingrid Eagly’s piece 
“Prosecuting Immigration”, criminal law is distinguished “by virtue of its 
strength in law enforcement, severity in sanctioning regime, and imposition 
of moral blame”.83  
 
In an Issue Paper from the Council of Europe, the Human Rights 
Commissioner Thomas Hammarberg breaks criminal law into two different 
streams. Firstly, criminalizations of acts that harm another individual that 
therefore become victims. Secondly, the so-called “victimless crimes” that do 
harm to society at large but not to an individual.  The commissioner argues 
that crimes of border crossing are victimless crimes because a person who is 
not authorized to stay on a country’s territory does not harm another person. 
The “harm” is merely done to the state’s sovereignty to control their borders. 
The commissioner furthermore argues that the most legitimate task of 
criminal law is that of criminalizing behavior hurting other individuals.84  
                                               
77 “Crimmigration, Surveillance and Security Threats: A multidisciplinary dialogue: 
Introduction” (2014)  
78 ASHWORTH pp. 17 - 18. 
79 ASP, ULVÄNG and JAREBORG p. 35. 
80 ASP, ULVÄNG and JAREBORG p. 35. 
81 ASHWORTH p. 33. 
82 STUMPF 2006 p. 411. 
83 EAGLY p. 1296. 
84  HAMMARBERG p. 8. 
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 Following this line of thought, Jennifer M. Chacón, Professor of Law 
at University of California, questions whether or not criminalizing migration 
is a fitting policy, especially considering that immigration ‘generally poses 
little of not threat to public safety or security’.85 She says that states use 
criminal law in order to handle the issue of migration, “despite the fact that 
these laws are unlikely to have any positive public safety or security 
effects”.86 I will come back to the use of criminal law as a migration control 
tool in the next section. 
 
2.3.1.1' Why'criminalization'of'immigration'violations?''
Considering this particular position of criminal law in our society, why is 
criminal law used? Chacón argues that the most obvious basis for why 
immigration violation is criminalized is because of the ‘myth of migrant 
criminality’, together with racism and nativism.87 The American Professor of 
Law, David Alan Sklansky, has stated that part of the explanation is ‘cultural 
obsession with security’: addressing every possible problem through criminal 
law.88 CC García Hernandez, Associate Professor at Capital University Law 
School, partly links crimmigration to the issue of long standing racial bias and 
racial animosity in the United States. He says that after the civil rights 
movement, law could no longer discriminate based on race. Instead, racist 
bias expressed itself in making crime the marker of undesirability. The tactics 
were seemingly “race-neutral”. In reality, the United States have been at war 
with its own underclass, which is predominantly made up of people of 
color. 89  Stumpf discusses how “membership theory” plays a role: both 
migration and criminal law mark the outsiders from the insiders. 90 
 
All of these explanations contribute to the understanding of the overall 
picture. Understandably, there is not one single explanation for why these 
changes have occurred. Since my essay concerns internal control of 
foreigners I have looked more closely on the articles that discuss enforcement 
and criminal law as a tool for migration control.  
2.3.2' Criminal'law'as'an'instrument'for'migration'
control'
2.3.2.1' Ad^hoc'instrumentalism'
David Alan Sklansky has elaborated on an explanation as well as a feature of 
crimmigration in his article “Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc 
Instrumentalism”91. He acknowledges that even if many of the explanations 
already offered; nativism, overcriminalization and cultural obsession with 
security, do have bearing, there is a missing piece in the puzzle to explain 
                                               
85 CHACÓN pp. 616 – 620. 
86 CHACÓN p. 628. 
87 CHACÓN p. 629. 
88 SKLANSKY p. 196. 
89 GARCÍA pp. 1485-1496. 
90 STUMPF 2006 p. 377. 
91 (2012) 15 New Criminal Law Review 157.  
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how crimmigration has won ground. He calls this “ad-hoc instrumentalism”. 
Not only can ad-hoc instrumentalism be used as an explanatory factor, it also 
has a descriptive value.92  
 
Sklansky argues that two “intellectual projects of the mid-twentieth-century’s 
judges and legal scholars proved unworkable”93. The first one is the idea of a 
principled line between criminal law and civil law (as described earlier), and 
the second, the aim of making criminal law less discretionary.94  
 The line between the two fields was brought on by an effort to “tie 
criminal law, in a rationalized and systematic way, to principles of moral 
philosophy”95. This is no longer the case. Instead, Sklansky contends, both 
criminal law scholars and the public are more focused on ‘what works’. Law 
should be used pragmatically, not philosophically. 96  This is the 
‘instrumentalism’ in the term.  
 The second intellectual project was to make criminal law less 
discretionary. According to Legomsky, legal scholars and judges wanted to 
limit the discretion contained in the criminal process. The effort covered 
everything from police officers to judges. Sentences were given according to 
fixed terms that were mandatory for judges to follow and new rules were 
meant to reign in police discretion. However, by the end of the twentieth 
century, criminal justice scholar started doubting the project. The discretion 
just moved elsewhere in the system, for example to the prosecutors. 97 
Scholars have then called for more discretion back to the judges.98 The lost 
fight against reigning in discretion is the ‘ad-hoc’ in the term. 
 
These two failed projects have led to what Sklansky calls Ad hoc-
instrumentalism. The boundary between criminal law and civil law is now 
seen as random historical coincidence and discretion is now accepted and 
almost wanted.99 Therefore, it is not strange that ground-level officials should 
be able to use whatever possible tool to fight a dangerous individual. Ad hoc 
instrumentalism therefore ‘empowers a wider range of front-line officials, 
including but not limited to prosecutors, to view all substantive laws and 
enforcement regimes, criminal and civil, as tools to be employed strategically, 
as the circumstances demand’.100  
                                               
92 SKLANSKY p. 161. 
93 SKLANSKY p. 197. 
94 SKLANSKY p. 197. 
95 SKLANSKY p. 197. 
96 SKLANSKY p. 198. 
97 SKLANSKY pp. 199 – 202. 
98 This can be seen in the crimmigration literature. In the crimmigration literature decreased 
discretion for immigration judges and officers have been described as part of the 
crimmigration “problem”, where judges have no room for prosecution remission and 
therefore avoid deportation. Sklansky underlines that prosecutorial discretion is part of the 
“discretion”-problem, which crimmigration scholars do not go into. 
99 SKLANSKY p. 200. 
100 SKLANSKY p. 201. 
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2.3.2.2' Broadening' the' law' for' more' efficient'
enforcement'
Ingrid Eagly has also noticed the “instrumentality” of criminal law in 
migration control and how the two areas affect each other. Her article from 
2010 examines the actual outcomes in the criminal justice system. I find her 
discussion on the incentives of broadening immigration and criminal law 
especially interesting and valuable for my essay. 
  
A broadening of the criminal code can have other aims then purely being 
preventive or deterring. It can also enable intervention by the Police at an 
“earlier stage” (before something more serious takes place) or to intervene 
against minor conduct.101 Another effect of a broad criminal code noted by 
criminal law scholars is that it opens the possibility to intervene on other 
grounds than what is really the suspected crime. Eagly describes the example 
of a broken taillight being used as an excuse to detain a person, where the real 
aim is to investigate a murder.  
 Immigration scholars have also noted this “broadening –effect”. A 
broader immigration code gives immigration authorities greater discretion in 
enforcing admission and removal. Eagly wants to direct the attention to the 
interaction of the two systems and look at how a change in the content of the 
law on one side of the divide will affect the procedural outcomes on the 
other.102 It is generally thought that this effect only goes one way: from the 
criminal side to the immigration side. This is because the police have greater 
powers in the criminal system than in the immigration system. Eagly notes 
however, that practices that would not be allowed in the criminal sphere are 
accepted in the migration sphere. 103 A police officer that stops a person on 
the street without probable cause is excused if it is done for migration 
purposes, thus lowering the threshold for police intervention. 104 This is one of 
the examples where Eagly notes that the two spheres of law have their own 
distinct set of advantages.  
 
2.3.2.3' The'loss'of'the'rule'of'law'and'accountability'
Eagly and Sklansky describe a similar picture: enforcement is the aim and to 
achieve migration control, the enforcer can pick the most advantageous 
enforcement regime. Sklansky argues that there are two main problems with 
this, what he calls ‘ad hoc instrumentalism’: the loss of the rule of law and the 
loss of accountability. I will focus on the loss of rule of law. Sklansky notes 
that “rule of law” is a quite an imprecise concept but that one of the ideas is 
“that government power should be exercised according to rules rather than 
official whim”, in order to ensure foreseeability of the use of the states’ 
coercive powers and the individual’s possibility to plan her actions 
accordingly.105  Sklansky says that ad hoc instrumentalism seems to threaten 
this ideal. Furthermore, it is “troublingly close to the concerns expressed by 
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Justice Robert Jackson”106  who have written on the dangers of abuse of 
prosecutorial power: 
 
“Jackson was worried, in particular, about prosecution becoming 
‘personal’: he was worried about situations where ‘the real crime 
becomes that of being unpopular with the dominant or governing 
group, being attached to the wrong political views or being personally 
obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor himself.”107 
 
Jackson was referring to the choice between invoking enforcement at all, or 
avoiding it, which Sklansky says is very troublesome. However, it is not as 
troublesome to, after enforcement has been invoked, choose between two 
applicable systems: the immigration system or the criminal system. Sklansky 
still maintains that there is something worrying about giving this much 
discretion to low-level officials to both detect “troublemakers” and then 
decide the most advantageous enforcement. Focus should instead lie on the 
nature of the offense.108 
 Nevertheless, it is hard to build extensive criticism towards this 
system based on the notion of rule of law. Discretion is part of every 
prosecutor’s and police officers daily job.109 Furthermore, it is a pragmatic 
system that can tailor enforcement solutions for every situation.110 
 
Sklansky further argues that accountability is lost. This is because there are 
different actors and officials in the two systems. Overlapping responsibilities 
makes it difficult to hold someone accountable through public oversight and 
political pressure.111 It is especially worrisome because crimmigration-law 
only applies to non-citizens, a particularly vulnerable group.  
 
The ad-hoc instrumentalism goes hand in hand with what scholars have 
pointed at: criminal law as tool for migration objectives. They argue that the 
criminal justice system has been restructured to “allow for agency control and 
promotion of immigration objectives within the criminal prosecution”.112  
2.4' Concluding'remarks'
Because of the perceived difference between criminal law and migration law 
procedural rules and constitutional protection have been applied differently. 
Crimmigration does not only turn its attention to the merger of these two 
areas. It also offers a new set of ”glasses” which scholars can use in trying to 
detect this development as well as chart the effects of it. The detection have 
lead to criticism and questioning of this trend, that I think are both valuable 
and useful. In this essay, I will use these new “glasses” when looking at the 
Swedish law.  
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3' Criminal' and' administrative'
divide'in'the'Swedish'context'
For “crimmigration” to be an interesting concept, it presupposes a division 
between administrative and criminal law. In this chapter, I examine if there is 
such a division in the Swedish law. This chapter is not a comprehensive 
summary and there are many other similarities and differences that could be 
discussed. However, there is one significant difference between the two areas 
that I go into, namely the view of the outcomes. I also look at the procedural 
rules and the court system in order to give the reader an understanding of the 
two legal areas. 
3.1' Public'law'
As outlined earlier, the strict separation of criminal law and migration law in 
the United States has relied on the perceived administrative nature of 
deportation as well as the division of powers between the states and the 
federal government. 113  In the Swedish context criminal law and 
administrative law (förvaltningsrätt) has not been as clearly separated. 
Administrative law is part of the branch of “public law” (offentlig rätt). 
Today, public law has two different meanings. In the legal education it is used 
in a restrictive way, referring to administrative law and constitutional law. In 
the scientific arena it has a broader meaning; in addition to administrative and 
constitutional law it also encapsulates tax, criminal and procedural law. 
Public law is simply the opposite of private law.114 Public law regulates the 
relationship between the state and the individual, which is true for both 
criminal and administrative law.115 However, there are still some important 
differences that I discuss in the next section.  
3.1.1' The'nature'of'the'outcomes'
The state tries to affect the citizens and their behavior through various means 
of social control that is formal in its nature. Examples would be offered 
benefits, advice and encouragement, education, information or propaganda, 
offering or requiring permits for certain activities, physical obstacles in public 
spheres; as well as threat of coercive interventions and enforcement of the 
same. Coercive interventions can also range between taxation and care for 
dangerous individuals to criminal punishment. Criminalization is therefore 
only one of many ways to achieve social control.116 In this range of measures, 
criminalization is separated from the others. Criminalization is often seen as 
the last resort, the principle of ultima ratio. This is because punishment 
generally is thought of as something negative. Other coercive interventions by 
the state have some kind of reparative function, inter alia if someone needs 
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health care for a contagious disease etc.117 The punishment is at its core 
repressive.118 
 A defining part of administrative law is that in the matters containing 
an individual against the state, the ideal outcome would mean reaching a 
materially correct decision. This means that there is no perceived conflict of 
interest between the state and the individual. In this line of thinking, an 
applicant who fulfills the criteria set out in the law will receive refugee 
status. 119  Compare this to criminal law where there are two perceived 
opposing interests: the search for the materially “correct” truth competes with 
concern for legal security-issues. As Herbert Packer would label it: crime 
control and due process are two opposites.120 Even if the two may not be 
inherently incompatible (in a perfect world all criminals would be punished 
and nobody innocent would be convicted) the conflict between the 
individual’s interest for legal security and society’s interest in crime control is 
acknowledged.121 
 In American legal history the administrative nature of deportation122 
has played a big part in the view of migration law. In Sweden deportation due 
to crime is not regarded as a punishment in the legal sense. This follows from 
ch.1 sec. 3 of the Penal Code (SFS 1962:700). This paragraph prescribes that 
there is only two types of punishments in Swedish criminal law: fine and 
imprisonment. Deportation due to a criminal offence is neither considered a 
criminal sanction; it is regarded as a special legal effect. This means that the 
judge should take the effects of deportation into account when conducting 
meting out of punishment. If deportation causes injury to the defendant, the 
punishment can sometimes be reduced. 123  Deportation on basis of being 
unauthorized is also an administrative matter, regulated in the Aliens Act. 
Decision on deportation is taken in connection to the process of residence 
permit.124 
3.1.2' Procedure'and'courts'
While criminal sanctions are negative, applying for a residence permit for any 
reason is a permit case.125 This implies that the outcome is positive. The 
general rule for a permit case is that the applicant has the burden of proof to 
prove that he or she is entitled to the benefit. However, The Migration Court 
of Appeal has recognized the special nature of asylum applications. Because 
of the great impact on the individual’s life and liberty the outcome has and 
how difficult it is to prove the circumstances for the applicant, the authority 
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and the court and the applicant share the burden of investigation 
(utredningsbörda).126 
 In criminal cases, the burden of proof is firmly placed on the 
prosecutor. The prosecutor has to prove the facts while the defendant can stay 
completely passive. The defendant can be passive throughout the entire 
proceeding.127 
 In criminal matters the defendant/applicant has the right to a public 
counsel.128  For immigration matters, a public counsel is provided unless it 
can be assumed that there is no need for one. There is however, a 
presumption for the need of a counsel. 129  
 Criminal law is adjudicated in a general court in contrast with other 
types of public law, they are adjudicated in administrative courts. 130  In 
immigration proceedings, the first instance is the Migration Board. Under 
officialprincipen, the Migration Board has to investigate the matter to the 
extent that it is necessary. It is also the authority that has the main 
responsibility for the investigation. In this instance, the authority is both the 
adjudicator and the investigator.131 Since 2006, an applicant can appeal the 
decision to the Migration Court, which is part of the Administrative Courts. 
Administrative decisions and court decisions used to be easily separable. 
Through the establishment of administrative courts and increased focus on 
due process and legal security issues in the administrative process as a whole, 
this difference in character is less apparent.132  
3.2' Summary'
This chapter is meant to give a brief overview of the differences and 
similarities of criminal law and immigration law as part of public law in the 
Swedish context. The difference in the perception of the outcome of criminal 
law and immigration law is the defining feature of the separation of the two 
procedures. This influences the burden of proof. It also influences the 
perceived need for procedural safeguards and legal security which I return to 
in chapter 6. However, they both regulate the relationship between the state 
and the individual, and they are both partly adjudicated in a court. In the next 
chapter I will go through how the main actor, the Police Authority, function 
in both of these spheres.   
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4' The'Actor'
One of my research questions is: “What actors and tools are used for internal 
control of foreigners? How are they to be understood in the 
criminal/administrative divide?“ In this section, I will focus on the Police 
who are the major actor in internal control of foreigners. Because one of the 
overarching research questions is if internal control of foreigners is part of the 
crimmigration-trend, meaning if it is a new phenomenon, I will start this 
chapter with giving the reader a short historic background.  In the next section 
I cover the applicable legal framework that regulate the Police Authority’s 
aims and duties. I will end this chapter by trying to answer on which side of 
the divide internal control of foreigners belong when looking at the rules I 
discuss in this chapter. There perceived nature of the controls are important in 
order to establish what procedural rules apply, which I return to in ch. 6. 
 
This review is in no way comprehensive. The aim is merely to show the 
reader that the Police have been involved in migration control to a various 
degree since the first Aliens Act from 1927. After I covered some brief 
history, I move onto today’s regulation of the Police, and their aims and 
duties. This is in order to present under what mandate they operate in relation 
to internal control of foreigners. 
4.1' History'
In the crimmigration literature, the intertwinement of migration agencies and 
law enforcement agencies is recognized as one part of the “crimmigration-
trend”.133  
 The first migration control agency that was established in Sweden was 
a section of the Stockholm Police department in 1937, under the National 
Board of Social Affairs (Socialstyrelsen). The Aliens Board, an independent 
authority, later replaced the bureau. Both of these institutions were temporary. 
It was not until 1969 that a permanent state agency was established: the 
Immigration Authority (Statens Invandrarverk (SIV)).134 Despite the fact that 
these control agencies have had the majority of the responsibility for 
migration control, the Police have been active to various degrees throughout 
the years as well.  In the Alien Acts from 1927 and 1937135 it is stated that a 
foreigner arriving to the country has to report his presence to the nearest 
police station (sec. 3). In 1937, it was the Police that decided on the matter of 
expulsion of aliens unless they had fled from another country for political 
reasons; in these cases the matter was handed over to the National Board of 
Social Affairs (Socialstyrelsen).136 The importance of the Police as a key 
factor in ensuring speedy and legally secure investigations in asylum claims 
has been underlined in preparatory works from both the 1970s and the 
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1980s.137 These are just a few examples of how the Police have played in role 
in migration control in Sweden. 
 In the 1990s however, this was partly changed when a more strict 
separation of responsibilities was implemented. In 1992, all applications and 
investigations for asylum were transferred to SIV from the Police and in 
1996, residence permit applications were moved as well. 1997, SIV took over 
the responsibility of fingerprint collection138 and the responsibility and the 
running of detention centers.139   
 This change was part of a bigger trend that affected all state 
authorities who where to focus on their core activities and build their efforts 
around that. Since the Police’s main objective was to maintain order and 
security in society, some tasks that traditionally had lied with the Police were 
now deemed outside of the scope of these “core activities”.140  
 When rearranging the division of responsibility, three main tasks 
stayed with the Police: internal control of foreigners, passport control and 
enforcement of removal decisions. They were all deemed to be inside the 
scope of the Police’s main objective: to maintain order and security in 
society. It is not mentioned if it is thought of as a crime preventing strategy or 
a migration control strategy. 
4.1.1' Summary'
Unlike the United States, law enforcement in Sweden historically has had a 
prominent role in everything from implementing to adjudicating migration 
decisions. The separation of powers at law enforcement-level has been 
motivated with regard to practical matters more than legislative and 
philosophical. There is no sudden or emerging intertwinement of migration 
control agencies and law enforcement agencies in the way that is described by 
crimmigration-literature.  
4.2' The'Police'Authority’s'Aims'and'Duties'
The Swedish Police Authority is a state authority, placed under the 
governance of the Government. The Police Authority replaced the National 
Police Board in 2015141 in order to streamline and simplify the control of the 
authority. 142 The new organization separated the Swedish Security Service 
from the Police Authority but did not lead to any changes regarding the 
separation of powers.143 The main governing body for police work is the 
Police Act (SFS 1984:387). I will go through sec. 1 and 2 of the Police Act in 
the following sections. 
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4.2.1' The'Police'Authorities'Aims'sec.'1'
The first section of the Police Act lays down the aims of Police work. The 
second article enumerates the duties of the Police: how this aim should be 
reached. The work of the police is not regulated in detail in fear of making the 
regulation too stale. Instead, the Police should be able to adapt to the 
changing conditions of society when planning their work.144 
 The first section in the Police Act states that police work shall aim at 
maintaining public order and security, as well as providing protection and 
assistance to the public. There is no clear definition of “public order and 
security”. In the comment to the Police Act it is said that the Police have an 
obligation and authority to prevent, stop and take measures against 
criminalized acts of all kinds as long as the act fall under public prosecution. 
This is not their only task. They should also try to achieve conditions for a 
safe and secure coexistence. This means that they have the authority to 
intervene against other nuisances than just criminalized acts.145 To mention 
one example, the police have the right to detain a person who is a threat to the 
public order according to sec. 13 in the Police Act. 
4.2.2' The'Police'Authorites'Duties'sec.'2'
The duties of the Police Authority are regulated in the second article of the 
Police Act. The wording of the provision was partly changed in 2014 but 
there was no substantive amendment.146  The section is made up of five 
subsections. Of particular interest for this essay is subsection 2, 3 and 5.  
  The second subsection declares that it is the duty of the police to 
maintain and supervise the public order and safety and take action when such 
disturbances occur. The subsection refers to the Police Authority’s 
“supervisory work” (övervakningsverksamhet) 147 . This “supervision” is 
separated into general supervision and traffic supervision.148 Internal control 
of foreigners is an example of general supervision.149  
 The third subsection refers to criminal investigations and surveillance. 
It says that the Police Authority should carry out investigations and 
surveillance of indictable offences. If a crime is made known to a police 
officer, the officer has to report this under sec. 9 the Police Act. When it is 
considered a crime to be on the territory without documents (I will go through 
the Swedish legislation in this part in ch. 5), migration control can be 
exercised under this duty as well.  
 I shall also mention subsection five. It refers to other duties of the 
Police Authority stemming from administrative regulations and regulations in 
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force prior to the introduction of the Police Act.150 It is under this last duty 
that the Police assist the Migration Board with removal and deportation of 
foreigners.151 
 The duties often overlap and there is no strict division between the 
different tasks. Instead, the preparatory work states that the aim is to have a 
comprehensive notion of the duties and the work at large.152 It is therefore no 
strict separation of migration law and criminal law when looking at the police 
work. There are also those duties that are not exemplified in the law. These 
duties often stem from custom or tradition in Police work.153 This general 
idea of authority is often made use of in the area of traffic control.154  
4.2.3' Internal' control' of' foreigners' –' an'
administrative'task?'
Considering that the Police have multiple duties, where does internal control 
of foreigners belong in this administrative/criminal divide? Internal control of 
foreigners has two purposes. The first is to control that foreigners without 
authorization are not residing inside the country. The second is to detect 
foreigners facing removal.155 This aim has not changed over the years. There 
is no mentioning of the controls as crime fighting tools. In a preparatory work 
from 1977 the Government conclude that the Police play an important role in 
administrative matters relating to aliens. They then exemplify this with 
passport control and internal control of foreigners.156 So far, I think most 
people would argue that the control is administrative. In chapter 7 – 9, I go 
through how the control also can be and has been perceived as belonging to 
the criminal sphere. 
4.2.4' Concluding'remarks'
In the example of internal control of foreigners, there are two dimensions of 
social control: to search for people without authorization staying in the 
country and to prevent crime committed by these people.157 The first 
dimension is thought of as an administrative task under subsection 2 and 5: to 
find unauthorized individuals and enforce removal decisions. The second 
dimension clearly belongs in the criminal sphere, and is dealt with under 
subsection 3. The crimmigration literature has shown the conflation of these 
duties when the mere presence of undocumented immigrants is criminalized. 
In the next chapter I will go through the legislative aspect of criminalization 
in the Swedish context. 
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5' Criminalization'of'immigration'
violations'in'the'Aliens'Act'
Crimmigration-literature has identified criminal law as a tool for migration 
control. For this to be possible, immigration violations need to be 
criminalized. Another factor acknowledged in the crimmigration-literature is 
the high prosecution rate of immigration violations. In this chapter I therefore 
review the relevant criminal provisions found in the Aliens Act as well as 
cover the prosecution statistics for these crimes.  
 Criminalizing per se is not the focus of this essay; rather I want to 
highlight how criminalizing migration offers a criminal law-route into 
migration control. This together with the (more common) administrative-
route creates a migration control-system over multiple legal arenas, with 
different procedural safeguards. Kanstroom argues that when the mere 
presence of an undocumented migrant is criminalized this indicates “a nearly 
complete merger between the criminal and civil immigration control 
system”.158    
5.1' Criminal'provisions'in'the'Aliens'Act'
The Alien Act contains nine key criminal provisions criminalizing 
immigration violations. They can be found in the 20th chapter sec. 1 - 9. I will 
not go through criminalization of human smuggling found in sec. 8 – 9 and 
facilitation of unauthorized residence for financial gains in sec. 7. I disregard 
these provisions for two reasons. Firstly: because both Swedish citizens and 
non-citizens can be guilty of these crimes. Secondly, which is intimately 
linked to the first reason, the criminalized acts of interests are acts that the 
immigrant is guilty of based on the mere fact that he or she is an 
undocumented immigrant; because he or she has to work as an undocumented 
immigrant; because the immigrant entered the country without authorization 
something many immigrants do. Human smuggling, organization of human 
smuggling and facilitation of unauthorized residence is an act outside of this, 
not connected to the lack of legal status. 
 There are other criminal regulations of interest, in particular document 
fraud in order to reach the territory. I will not cover this due to time- and 
space constraints.   
5.1.1' Unauthorized'presence'
Unauthorized stay on the territory is criminalized through ch. 20 sec. 1 and 
sec. 2 in the Aliens Act. Both provisions are in no way new: comparable rules 
can be found in earlier versions of the Aliens Act as far back as 1927159 and 
1937.160   
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The first section in the 20th chapter criminalizes unauthorized residence. If a 
person is apprehended on the territory this is punishable with a fine. The 
committee that wrote the government report161 suggested that prison for six 
months should be the maximum sentence, but the Government did not agree. 
The motivation was that undocumented migrants in a majority of the cases 
can be deported instead and imprisonment was therefore deemed 
unnecessary.162 The choice to resort to deportation instead of imprisonment is 
further motivated by reducing procedural costs.163 In cases where the migrant 
does have a principled right to a residence permit, e.g. if the person is married 
to a person with a residence permit or if their residence permit has expired, 
there may be grounds for prosecution. According to the preparatory works 
there is a public interest of not allowing foreigners to reside in the country 
without authorization and a criminal sanction could therefore be needed.164  
 Ch. 20 sec. 2 prohibits entry and residence in breach of an entry ban. 
This means that if someone (who is? What is correct?) subject to a removal 
decision is apprehended on the territory because he or she never left or 
because the person returned despite having an entry ban, the migrant can be 
punished with prison for up to a year. It has to have happened knowingly. If it 
is considered a minor offence, they may be fined instead (ch. 20 sec. 2 para. 
1). In the preparatory works from 1954, it is said that if the alien is 
apprehended at the border he or she should be deported directly and not be 
prosecuted. 165  Asylum seekers and other beneficiary’s of subsidiary 
protection166 are directly exempt from this provision, which is stated in ch. 20 
sec. 2 para. 2. If the crime is a minor offense the person should not be 
prosecuted unless it is motivated from a public position167 meaning that is it 
covered by special consideration of charges (särskild åtalsprövning) (ch. 20, 
sec. 2, para. 3). This last paragraph was added in 1980. The reasoning behind 
this was that the prosecutor should be able to give discretionary relief for 
social and humanitarian reasons, at the time mainly to Finnish people living 
close to the border. The scenarios described in the preparatory works are 
narrow, inter alia, visiting a sick relative or another urgent need for a 
temporary visit. However, the importance of prosecution was still underlined 
in order to maintain the respect for removal decisions.168 
 As long as the immigrant is deportable, the legislator prefers 
enforcement of deportation rather than prosecution of immigration violations. 
This is justified using economical reasons as well as being the more practical 
solution: to prosecute somebody who is being deported anyway is considered 
unnecessary. The unwillingness to prosecute immigration violations is the 
very opposite of the development in the United States, where prosecution of 
these crimes are at an all time high. 169  It can be discussed whether a 
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criminalization of the minor offences is necessary at all when it is rarely 
carried out.  
 The exception to this rule is when a foreigner has a legitimate claim to 
a residence permit. It is stated that there might be a need to punish a foreigner 
who is residing in the country without applying for authorization because it is 
against the public interest. I question why this public interest only covers 
those who are not easily deportable. One suggestion could be what Sklansky 
calls ad-hoc instrumentalism. 170   In these cases, discretion is left to the 
prosecutor to decide what legal sphere should be invoked and what legal tools 
should be used in order to reach the policy objective: managed migration. It is 
what Sklansky would call “tailored enforcement”.171  
5.1.2' Unauthorized'work'
Both employees working without work authorization and employers hiring 
undocumented immigrants may face punishment in the Swedish legislation. 
The employer can also be bound to pay a special fee regardless of an actual 
criminal conviction and there are other special legal effects meant to deter 
people from hiring undocumented migrants, e.g. ineligibility for state 
benefits.172 
 Ch. 20 sec. 3 regulates the worker. A fine may be imposed if a person 
is found working without a work permit or conducting business that requires 
a permit. Sec. 5 in the same chapter regulates the employer sanction. The 
punishment for the employer is either a fine or, if it’s a serious offense, prison 
up to one year. In the Aliens Act from 1927, both the employer and the 
employee would face pecuniary penalty if an immigrant worked without a 
work permit.173 The punishment for an employer who hired an alien without a 
work permit harshened in 1976. The importance of combating illegal 
employment was underlined.174  
5.1.3' Crossing'of'an'external'border'
Crossing of an external border is criminalized in ch. 20 sec. 4 of the Aliens 
Act. Since entering the Schengen Agreement, all internal borders are 
abolished. However, the external borders still remain and are more heavily 
guarded than before.  
 If a person crosses the border without permission the punishment is a 
fine or imprisonment up to one year. Before entering into the Schengen 
Agreement in 2001, unlawful entry was not considered a crime in the 
Swedish legislation.175 The obligation for all member states to criminalize 
                                               
170 Ch. 2.3.2.1. 
171 SKLANSKY p. 209. 
172 These are found in ch. 20 sec. 12, 12 a, 15, 16, 17 of the Aliens Act.  
173 Sec. 38 SFS 1927:333. 
174 SANDESJÖ and WIKRÉN p. 758. 
175 Prop. 2003/04:35 p. 52. However, note that unauthorized stay have been a crime since 
1937, see ch. 4.1. 
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unlawful entry can be found in 4.3 of the Schengen Borders Code176. The 
sanction should be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”.  
 The Government has stated that the provision should not stop anyone 
from seeking asylum. Article 31 of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to 
Refugees requires that an asylum seeker without delay notify the authorities 
and show acceptable reasons for their unlawful entry. This, the Government 
concluded was enough to protect the right to seek asylum. No exception to 
the rule for refugees was therefore added to the provision.177 
5.1.4' Failure'to'notify'etc.'
Section 6 criminalizes the failure to notify in accordance with what is 
prescribed by law and ordinances issued under the Aliens Act. It furthermore 
criminalizes when a person gives false information or consciously withhold 
important facts in a permit case or claim under the Aliens Act. Since the 
obligation to notify authorities when hiring a foreigner was abolished in 1989 
this provision has little practical meaning.178 The provision has existed since 
1927 and in 1937 the maximum sentence was increased: six months 
imprisonment for a serious crime.179 In NJA 1990 s. 761 two foreigners were 
convicted to a pecuniary penalty for giving the authorities false information in 
their asylum application.   
5.1.5' Summary'
Criminalization of immigration violations relating to a lack of legal status is 
not a new phenomenon in the Swedish legislation. The majority of the 
criminal provisions in the Aliens Act I went through have been criminalized 
since the first Aliens Act in 1927. The only relatively new provision is found 
in section 4, crossing of an external border.  Crimmigration literature does 
however not only focus on criminalization per se, but to what extent 
criminalization leads to procedural effects.180 In the next section I therefore 
go through the data of prosecution for immigration violations. 
5.2' Prosecution'rate'today'
Considering how many internal controls are carried out every year and how 
many of these lead to different enforcement: very few are actually prosecuted. 
The statistics from the Swedish National Council of Crime Prevention 
(Brottsförebyggande rådet, BRÅ) does not specify which of the provisions in 
the Aliens Act that rendered criminal responsibility. Table 1 shows reported 
crime. As can be seen when compared to table 2, not all of them were solved 
or lead to legal proceedings. Human smuggling has its own separate data 
while the others are counted together. Note that sec. 1, unauthorized 
                                               
176 Regulation (EC) 562/2006 of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across borders [2006] OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, p. 1–32 
(Schengen Borders Code). 
177 Prop. 2003/04:35 p. 53. 
178 WIKRÉN and SANDESJÖ p. 760. 
179 NJA 1990 s. 761. 
180 Ch. 2.2.3.2. 
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residence, and sec. 3 or 5, unauthorized work, are not included in the 
statistics. There is no explanation for this in the report.  
 
Table 1: 
Reported crimes 2004181 2012182 2013183 
Human smuggling (sec. 8) 26 217 242 
Organizing of human 
smuggling (sec. 9) 
37 104 69 
Other crimes against the 
Aliens Act (sec. 2, 4, 6, 7) 
672 1211 1271 
In total 735 1532 1582 
 
Table 2 shows data for crimes against the Aliens Act and the number of legal 
proceedings. The statistics just show data for “crimes against the Aliens Act”. 
It also contains information of the number of prosecution remissions 184 
(åtalsunderlåtelser), order of summary punishment 185  (strafföreläggande) 
and number of judgements by the court.  
 
Table 2: 
 Abstention 
from 
prosecution: 
Order of 
summary 
punishment: 
Judgement 
by the court: 
Total number of 
legal proceeding 
decisions: 
Of which 
were 
sentenced to 
prison: 
2013186 9 130 181 320 65  
2012187 28 183 159 370 44  
2004188 16 203 112 383 41 
 
Despite the more than twofold increase of reported crimes, there is no real 
increase in the number of legal proceedings. There was no possible 
explanation to this offered in the report. The increased number could be 
explained by the increase in the efforts from law enforcement in the case of 
internal control of foreigners that we will see later.  
 The number of reported crimes is relatively low compared to how 
many internal controls are performed189 and the number of controls that lead 
to further actions. In 2012, around 8 000 controls led to other interventions 
                                               
181 Kriminalstatistik 2004 p. 46.  
182 Kriminalstatistik 2012 p. 52  
183 Kriminalstatistik 2013 p. 52.  
184 Abstention from prosecution: when the prosecutor decides not to prosecute even if the 
person is thought to be guilty of the crime. This can be the case if it’s a minor offence, if the 
perpetrator is young or if he or she is to be committed for another crime. The person normally 
has to have admitted to committing the crime for this to happen, EKELÖF, EDELSTAM and 
PAULI (2006) pp. 155 – 165.  
185 Order of summary punishment: When a criminal investigation does not lead to a 
prosecution and a trial even if the prosecutor assesses that there is enough evidence for a 
conviction. It is voluntarily and the suspect has to admit to the crime and accept the 
punishment. EKELÖF, EDELSTAM and PAULI (2006) pp. 283 – 286. 
186 Kriminalstatistik 2013 pp. 196 - 198. 
187 Kriminalstatistik 2012 pp. 200 - 202. 
188 Kriminalstatistik 2004 pp. 156-158. 
189 I go through this data in ch. 8. 
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from the Police. 190  Only 370 people however were subject to legal 
proceedings relating to crimes against the Aliens Act. It is not clear if ch. 20 
sec. 1 is included in the statistics on table 2, but it can be assumed that the 
majority of the cases under sec. 1 does not lead to any legal proceedings. 
5.3' Concluding'remarks'
In the case of prosecution of immigration violations, the development does 
not mirror the development in the United States. McLeod have criticized the 
American development of enforcing prosecution for immigration violations 
because they are an unnecessary cost when the immigrant may be deported 
either way.191 In this instance, McLeod and the Swedish legislator seems to 
agree with each other. However, the far-reaching criminalization of the mere 
status of being undocumented still opens up for criminal law enforcement if 
the police official or prosecutor deems it is necessary. In the next chapter I 
will review what legal rules apply in those cases. 
 
                                               
190 This data can be found in ch. 5. 
191 MCLEOD pp. 107 - 108.  
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6' Procedural' safeguards' and'
legal'principles'
Another research question in this essay is the following: How are procedural 
safeguards and legal principles affected depending on the legal area and how 
is this played out it in relation to citizens and non-citizens? The 
crimmigration-literature, has noted how different rules in the different arenas 
affected the procedural outcome in both.192 
  To be able to answer if the same tendencies can be discerned in the 
Swedish system, I need to review what principles are applicable. I will start 
with the fundamental right to establish if and how the law can discriminate 
based on citizenship. I will then move onto legal principle applicable to 
Police work, criminal investigations and coercive measures. The idea is to 
have this both as a backdrop and a measure in the discussion on Police work 
in relation to internal control of foreigners. 
 
In the case of the Police there is a difference between police work relating to 
a preliminary investigation in a criminal case and police work outside of this. 
Police work outside of this is e.g. internal control of foreigners and 
enforcement of removal decisions, duties of more administrative nature.193 
The latter is in large parts completely unregulated.194 The majority of the 
rules for criminal investigations can be found in the Code of Judicial 
Procedure (RB) (SFS 1942:740). I will review the applicable principles for 
both instances in this section. I will then move onto the role of preliminary 
investigation and the use of coercive measure in criminal investigations. The 
use of coercive measures in the case of internal control of foreigners will be 
discussed in chapter 9. 
6.1' Fundamental'rights'
6.1.1' The' European' Convention' on' Human'
Rights'
The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) is directly applicable as 
Swedish law.195  2:19 of the Instrument of Government prescribes that no act 
of law or other provision may be adopted which contravenes Sweden’s 
undertakings under the ECHR. Because the Convention is part of Swedish 
law, jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights is of 
importance as well.196  The Contracting Parties have to ensure the rights and 
freedoms defined in the first section to everyone within their jurisdiction; it 
                                               
192 Ch. 2.3.2. 
193 Ch. 3.2 and 3.3. 
194 BERGGREN and MUNCK p. 37. 
195 See ”Lagen (1994:1219) om den Europeiska konventionen angående skydd för de 
mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna”. 
196 LINDBERG p. 13. 
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therefore covers both citizens and non-citizens.197  However, the rights of 
greatest interest for internal control of foreigners are not absolute and can be 
limited, as we will see below.  
6.1.2' The'Instrument'of'Government''
Fundamental freedoms and rights are regulated in the Instrument of 
Government (IoG) (SFS 1974:152). The general rule is that the fundamental 
rights in the IoG apply to all Swedish citizens. However, many of the rights 
are also granted to foreigners. There are three different “steps” regarding the 
protection granted to non-citizens. The first is where the same protection is 
granted to citizens as well as non-citizens. That is when the provision states 
“everyone” or “no one”. The second step is when limitations of the protection 
can be made in law (ch. 2 sec. 25 IoG). The third step is when the provision 
does not cover foreigners at all. Then it is stated directly in the provision.  
 In ch. 2 sec. 20 IoG the rights that may be limited in law for Swedish 
citizens are enumerated. Limitations of these rights are only accepted if they 
live up to provision 21 – 25 in the same chapter. In sec. 21 it is stated that the 
limitation mush satisfy a purpose acceptable in a democratic society, and it 
must never go beyond what is necessary and it may never constitute a threat 
against the opinion formation fundamental in a democratic society.  
6.1.3' Fundamental' rights'and' internal'control'of'
foreigners'
There are some fundamental rights more relevant than others in the case of 
internal control of foreigners. One of them is the right to family and private 
life (art. 8 of the ECHR) and the “integrity”-provision in the rights catalogue 
in the second chapter of IoF (ch. 2 sec. 6 last para.).  
 The protection stemming from article 8 is not absolute, but 
interference is only allowed if it (i) has a legal basis; (ii) serves a legitimate 
purpose; and (iii) is necessary in a democratic society. Retention of 
fingerprints are common in internal control of foreigners 198 , and this 
constitutes an interference with private life according to the ECtHR199 When 
the data is automatically processed the need for safeguards is even greater, 
especially if it is used for police purposes. The storage also has to be 
proportionate: it has to be “relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purposes for which they are stored”.200  
 Another right that could be violated in connection to internal control 
of foreigners is the freedom of movement. The protection of freedom of 
movement can be found in the additional protocol no. 4 art. 2 of ECHR.201 
Art 2(1) reads “everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within 
                                               
197 Art. 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
198 I go through this at length in ch. 9.2. 
199 S and Marper v. The United Kindgom App no 30562/04 and 30566/04 (ECtHR, 4 
December 2008) para 78 - 86. 
200 M.K. v. France App no 19522/09 (ECtHR 18 April 2013) para 35. 
201 Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human RIghts and Fundamental 
Freedoms, securing certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in the 
Convention and in the first Protocol thereof [1963] COETS 4 (16 September 1963). 
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that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his 
residence”. Therefore, an undocumented immigrant is outside of the 
protection of this article. However, the Court has stated that “deprivation of 
and restriction upon liberty is merely one of degree or intensity, and not one 
of nature or substance”.202  Protection against the deprivation of liberty can be 
found in art. 5.1 of ECHR and it apply to all persons inside the state’s 
territory. However, this right is not absolute and can therefore be restricted if 
the restriction fulfills the aforementioned requirements.  
 Freedom of movement is protected in IoG as well. However, the rule 
specifically states: “all Swedish citizens shall also in other respects be 
guaranteed freedom of movement within the realm”, thus leaving foreigners 
outside of the protection (ch. 2 sec. 8 second sentence IoG ). Deprivation of 
liberty is protected in the same provision, which covers both citizens and non-
citizens. This can be limited in law for both groups according to ch. 2 sec. 
20(3) and  ch. 2 sec. 25(4) IoG.  
Internal control of foreigners has been criticized mainly for being 
discriminatory and profiling people who looked foreign, despite being 
Swedish citizens. 203  The protection against this kind of discrimination 
(because of belonging to a minority group, such as ethnic origin) is found in 
sec. 12. This does not mean that you can be discriminated against based on 
alienage. 
6.1.4' Accessing'human'rights'
The question of human rights and fundamental rights applying to non-citizens 
is not merely one of applicability or limitations accepted in law. There is also 
the issue of accessing these rights. Law Professor Gregor Noll has questioned 
the claimed universality of human rights because of the issue of 
undocumented migrants in his article “Why Human Rights Fail to Protect 
Undocumented Migrants”204. Because access to human rights presupposes 
contact with the state that wishes to enforce their removal, undocumented 
migrants are unable to access them. 205  This picture is confirmed in for 
example ECtHR case law, where the right to family life has been applied less 
favorably in the case of undocumented migrants.206 
 In the United States, the intertwinement of law enforcement agencies 
and immigration agencies have been criticized because undocumented 
immigrants no longer will be able to report crimes or acquire assistance from 
the state.207  In the preparatory works I have studied this kind of discussion 
                                               
202 Gillan and  Quinton v. The United Kingdom App no 4158/05 (ECtHR, 20 July 2004) para 
56. 
203  CANTWELL 2014; HASSEN KHEMIRI 2013. 
204 Noll argues that the right to human rights are not determined by de facto presence on the 
territory (“within a state’s jurisdiction”). Instead, it is connected to being a part of the 
political community. Stumpf (2006) has a similar argument concerning “membership theory” 
and the lack of political rights for both convicts and undocumented migrants.   
205 NOLL p. 243. 
206 NOLL p. 258. 
207 WISHNIE p. 1087. 
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have been almost absent, with one exception: children’s right to 
education208.209  
6.2' Public'power'principles'
There are other principles of interest when exercising public power but I have 
limited myself to the four most important principles in relation to Police work 
and coercive measures. These are: 
 
•' Principle of legality  
•' Principle of proportionality  
•' Principle of purpose 
•' Principle of necessity210  
 
All public power is exercised under the law according to ch. 1 sec. 3rd para. 
IoG which is the codification of the principle of legality. This includes all 
Police work. A police officer needs to have legislative support for an 
intervention or “official duty” as the provision states. However, it does not 
mean that a police officer needs explicit legal basis for every measure that 
needs to be taken in order to fulfill fundamental obligations. If a measure with 
consideration to the next two principles: necessity and proportionality, is both 
necessary and proportionate and also does not limit the freedom and rights 
guaranteed in the Instrument of Government, it is deemed part of police 
authority.211  
 
Section 8 of the Police Act codified the principles of proportionality and 
necessity.212 The principle of necessity means that an intervention only may 
occur when it is necessary to prevent or halt the danger or disturbance. 
Proportionality means “the danger or inconvenience that may be caused to an 
opposing interest must not be disproportionate to the purpose of the 
intervention”.213 This “future” proportionality should not be confused with 
retrospective proportionality determining the sanction based on the severity of 
a crime.214 According to the preparatory works these principles apply to all 
police work.215   
 
The principle of purpose is also regulated in section 8. It refers to the use of 
coercive powers and I will go through this under Ch. 6.3.1.2, when I review 
for what purposes coercive powers may be used. 
                                               
208 Noll elaborates on the view of children in the aforementioned article. Children are not 
thought of as decision makers and can therefore not be blamed for their irregular status, this 
could be one way of understanding this exception. 
209 Ch. 7.3.1. 
210 Legalitetsprincipen, Ändåmålsprincipen, Behovsprincipen, Proportionalitetsprincipen 
211 BERGGREN and MUNCK p. 60. 
212 BERGGREN and MUNCK p. 59. 
213 MANN p. 22. 
214 ASP, ULVÄNG and JAREBORG p. 242. 
215 HELMIUS p. 90. 
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6.3' Preliminary'investigation'
Preliminary investigations are a fundamental part of the Police’s criminal 
work. A preliminary investigation results in a number of legal effects. The 
23rd chapter of The Code of Judicial Procedure (RB) is applicable as well as 
the Decree on Preliminary Investigations (FUK) (SFS 1947:948). 
Furthermore, the use of coercive powers is regulated in ch. 23 – 28 in RB. 
Preliminary investigations have three purposes. The first is to establish if a 
crime has been committed, who can be justifiably suspected and to obtain 
enough information to press charges. The second purpose is to prepare the 
case so it can be presented at a hearing in court. These two are mentioned in 
ch. 23 sec. 2 in the Code of Judicial Procedure. There is also a third purpose, 
not mentioned in the law. It is to make the suspect aware of the investigation 
material so he or she can add or adjust material.216 
 
A preliminary investigation ”shall be initiated as soon as due to a report or for 
other reason there is reason to assume that an offence subject to public 
prosecution has been committed”217 (ch. 23 sec. 1 RB). It is sufficient that 
there is suspicion of an actual crime and that this is based on an evidentiary 
fact. 218  JO has stated that the threshold for initiating a preliminary 
investigation is very low.219 “Reason to assume” is said to be the lowest of all 
requirements for evidence in procedural law.220 
 Even if the law states that a preliminary investigation shall be 
initiated, there are exceptions to this rule. These can be found in ch. 23 sec. 1 
2nd para. RB and ch. 23 sec. 4 a in RB. Simplified, they take into 
consideration the cost of investigating the crime in proportion to the 
seriousness of the crime.221 
 In the Police’s crime investigating function there are stages coming 
before the preliminary investigation as well. Generally, this is police work 
without substantial suspicion of a crime (under sec. 2 of the Police Act) or 
when there is vague information about criminal activity that needs to be 
investigated further in order to properly assess whether a preliminary 
investigation should be initiated.222  
 Under the preliminary investigation there are a number of rules 
regulating how the investigation should be carried out. For example, evidence 
and information obtained during an interrogation of a suspect without a legal 
counsel present might not be legal ground for a conviction.223 A questioning 
or interrogation should be thoroughly documented (sec. 22 FUK).  The person 
who is justifiably suspected (skäligen misstänkt) has the right to continuously 
take part of what has figured in the investigation (ch. 23 sec. 18 RB). 
                                               
216 Prop 2004/05:143 p. 14; EKELÖF, EDELSTAM and PAULI p. 105. 
217 Translation from, The Code of Judicial Procedure Updated to SFS 1998:605, not an 
official translation. 
218 EKELÖF, EDELSTAM and PAULI p. 109. 
219 HYDÈN and LUNDBERG p. 91. 
220 HYDÈN and LUNDBERG p. 93. 
221 LINDBERG p. 7.  
222 EKELÖF, EDELSTAM and PAULI p. 110. 
223 EKELÖF, EDELSTAM and PAULI p. 141. 
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6.3.1' Coercive'measures'
In the Swedish legislation, so-called “coercive measures” or “coercive 
powers” (tvångsåtgärder) hold a unique position. Coercive powers are 
separated into two kinds: coercive measures implemented outside criminal 
investigations: administrative coercive measures; and coercive measures used 
to solve a crime: investigative coercive measures (straffprocessuella 
tvångsåtgärder). The difference between the two is the purpose of the 
measure.224 Investigative measures are used in criminal proceedings to obtain 
and secure evidence or a criminal conviction. Administrative coercive 
measures are used without connection to a criminal investigation and usually 
in exercise of public authority. 225 When a coercive measure is used against 
somebody, this constitutes an encroachment of somebody’s rights sphere, 
personal freedom and integrity or in his or her right of disposition. This is true 
for both administrative and investigative coercive measures.226  
 Later in my essay I will return to administrative coercive powers used 
in connection to internal control of foreigner. In the next section I will discuss 
investigative coercive powers. 
 
6.3.1.1' Investigative'coercive'measures'
6.3.1.1.1' What'is'a'coercive'measure?'
There is no clear definition of coercive powers. The Police Law Report 
(Polisrättsutredningen) defined coercive measures as follows: “the expression 
coercive measure should be reserved for those direct interventions against a 
person or property that is carried out as an exercise of public authority and 
which constitutes some sort of encroachment in another person’s right’s 
sphere” 227 . Furthermore, the individual needs to be protected against the 
intervention according to the Instrument of Governance or it must be 
considered a violation of the human rights set out in European Charter of 
Human Rights.228 
 The investigative coercive measures are regulated mostly in the Code 
of Judicial Procedure (RB) but can also be found in special law 
(speciallagstiftning). A measure can be considered a coercive measure even if 
there is no coercion involved. If the individual’s integrity is violated by the 
measure it can also be considered a coercive measure.229  Bylund argues that 
despite the fact that the term “coercive measure” might be inappropriate for a 
certain measure, it does not automatically mean that the measure should not 
receive the same protection as other coercive measures.230 One example is 
remote computer search (hemlig teleövervakning). If a measure is regulated in 
the law as a coercive measure, the question of whether or not it is a coercive 
                                               
224 EKELÖF, BYLUND and EDELSTAM p. 40. 
225 SOU 2004:110 p. 91. 
226 EKELÖF, BYLUND and EDELSTAM p. 40. 
227 My own translation. The original is: ”Begreppet tvångsmedel reserveras för sådana 
direkta ingripande mot person eller egendom som företas i myndighetsutövning och som 
utgör någon form av intrång i en persons rättssfär”. 
228 SOU 1995:45 pp. 137-141. 
229 EKELÖF, BYLUND and EDELSTAM p. 43 
230 EKELÖF, BYLUND and EDELSTAM p. 43. 
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measure is resolved. Thus, there are interventions that do violate integrity but 
are not considered investigate coercive measures because they are not 
classified as such legally.231 
6.3.1.1.2' When' can' investigative' coercive' measures' be'
used?'
For coercive measures to be used, a preliminary investigation has to have 
been initiated. If it is not, the decision to carry out a coercive power is 
regarded as a decision to initiate a preliminary investigation.232 The right to 
use investigative coercive measures is reserved for the Police, prosecutor and 
the general court in connection to criminal proceedings.233  
 
6.3.1.2' Purpose'of'the'use'of'coercive'measures'
Coercive powers cannot be used for other or wider purposes than what is 
stated in the law: to simplify the preliminary investigation or the trial, or to 
ensure enforcement of criminal convictions.234 Because of this there are some 
general limitations to the use of coercive powers. Coercive powers cannot be 
used: 
 
•' To prevent crime235  
•' To expose potential criminal activity before suspicion has reached the 
level required to initiate a preliminary investigation 
•' To gather ‘excess information’ (överskottsinformation) about another 
crime 
•' Strictly to simplify the Police’s checks to detect suspected persons 
•' As leverage against the suspect or another person.236  
 
A fundamental principle governing the use of coercive measures is the 
“principle of purpose” (ändamålsprincipen). It is derived from the principle 
of legality. It means that a coercive measure is only to be used for the purpose 
stated in the law, and when such measure is taken, it cannot be used for any 
other purpose than what was originally decided in that specific case.237 This 
means that the main purpose of an intervention cannot be to obtain evidence 
on another crime then the crime that constitutes the grounds for the coercive 
measure. As an example, a house raid cannot be used as a “general control 
measure” to investigate whether the suspect is guilty of other, more extensive 
criminal activity. 238  However, if a house search is conducted in order to 
search for a person and the person conducting the search has the authority to 
decide over such a coercive measure, he or she can immediately expand the 
                                               
231 EKELÖF, BYLUND and EDELSTAM p. 42. 
232 LINDBERG p. 7.  
233 In certain situations, amongst other, the Swedish Customs and the Swedish Coast Guard 
also have the right to use investigative coercive measures; SOU 2004:110, p. 91. 
234 LINDBERG p. 9. 
235 There is however exceptions when it comes to intelligence work mainly carried out by the 
Swedish Security Service, LINDBERG p. 8. 
236 LINDBERG pp. 9 – 11. 
237 JO 1990/91 s. 66. 
238 JO 1988/89 s. 67. 
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house search to include search for objects.239  This does require a formal 
decision to be lawful.   
 The prohibition of coercive powers in order to find “excess 
information” should not be confused with the situation when a coercive 
measure is being carried out, for example a house search, and information 
regarding other crimes is accidently found.240 Generally, the use of this kind 
of “excess information” has been accepted in the Swedish legislation.241 
 
6.3.1.3' Rules' applicable' to' the' use' of' coercive'
measures'
There is nothing regulated in the law about the duty to notify the person 
subject to a coercive measure except the rules on deprivation of liberty. The 
individual will most likely be aware of the coercive power against him or 
her.242 For the coercive power to have effect it must be decided by somebody 
with proper authority.243  A general principle is that the more intrusive a 
measure is, the higher must the competence be of the decision-making 
officer.244  
 The rules on documentation of a coercive measure are neither 
comprehensive now consistent. 245  However, there are some minimum 
requirements: what coercive measure has been decided upon, the crime that is 
the ground for the measure, the decision maker, and the purpose of the 
measure. 246  There is no strict form prescribed by law and each kind of 
coercive measure is regulated separately. A decision taken by a prosecutor is 
often in written form while an intervention by a police officer in the field is 
often oral. 247  Another documentation requirement is that the preliminary 
enquiry report needs to contain information about performed coercive 
measures.248 Today, the rules on documentation in the preliminary enquiry 
report is based on what kind of sentence might follow, if it can be expected 
that a pecuniary penalty will be the outcome, no report has to be 
established.249 
6.3.2' Concluding'remarks'
The right for the legislator to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens 
are broad. However, human rights should still apply to everyone inside the 
state’s territory, even if this rarely is the reality.  
                                               
239 LINDBERG p. 24. 
240 LINDBERG p. 11. 
241 LINDBERG p. 488. However, note that excess information found during secret coercive 
measures such as wiretapping are now regulated in the law. For more information, 
LINDBERG pp. 810 – 823. 
242 LINDBERG p. 86. 
243 LINDBERG p. 66. 
244 LINDBERG p. 67. 
245 LINDBERG p. 81. 
246 LINDBERG p. 83. 
247 LINDBERG p. 68-69. 
248 The obligation to keep an enquiry report is laid down in ch. 23 sec. 21 RB, more 
specifically what it has to contain are found in in sec. 20 – 22 in FUK. 
249 LINDBERG p. 79. 
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 Public power principles apply to all forms of police work. However, 
they are general principles and it is up to each officer to consider these before 
making a decision about how to act. In comparison, the Code of Judicial 
Procedure regulate in police work in detail. 
 The fact that police work outside of preliminary investigations is 
predominantly unregulated, while police work inside of preliminary 
investigations are heavily regulated, indicates that criminal law and 
administrative law are viewed differently. As discussed in chapter 3, criminal 
sanctions are seen as inherently negative and repressive, why legal safeguards 
are guaranteed to a higher degree than in administrative matters.  
 The use of coercive measure put the prosecution in a much more 
powerful position than the defense. This unequal position has been justified 
with the importance task at hand for prosecutors and the police: to fight 
crime. Coercive measures are deemed necessary in order to achieve this.250 
However, this recognized unequal position also means that the use of 
coercive powers is regulated and limitations are in place. In chapter 9 I will 
review what coercive powers may be used in relation to internal control of 
foreigners and compare this to the their regulation in the Code of Judicial 
Procedure. 
 
                                               
250 EKELÖF, BYLUND and EDELSTAM, p. 38. 
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7' Internal' control' of' foreigners'
in'the'spotlight'
One of my overarching research questions is if internal control of foreigners 
is an example of the crimmigration-trend. In this chapter I will therefore 
cover the historical background of the controls.  
 Internal control of foreigners has been allowed since the first Aliens 
Act was adopted in 1927.251  The provision on internal control of foreigners 
has not changed substantially since 1989.252 Traditionally, it has not been a 
prioritized task for the police. However, from the beginning of the 21st 
century, internal control of foreigners has been a priority for the Police and a 
discussed political issue.253 In this chapter, I aim at answering the question 
how and why this is and explain what has happened in the political discourse 
for the past 20 years. Firstly, I consider the available statistics relating to the 
number of controls to see if they have increased recently. Secondly, I look at 
government reports and preparatory works that discuss internal control of 
foreigners. I am interested in rationales used justify the increasing number of 
controls. After this I try to establish if these offered political rationales have a 
connection to crimmigration-thinking. 
7.1' Statistics'
There are no statistics on the number of controls before 2007. 2007 was when 
the National Police Board instructed all Police departments to document the 
reports. Therefore there is no proof that there was an actual increase of the 
number of controls compared to earlier years.  
 According to Fredrik Sundberg at the National Operative Unit at the 
Border Police Section, the gradual increase from 2007 until 2009 is partly 
explained by the fact that it took a while for the new routine to be 
implemented. 254  According to the report from Arena Idé other offered 
explanations have been the appropriation direction that expressed a desired 
increase in the number of enforced removals, improved training of police 
officers and the fact that the controls got its own code: R209, which 
simplified gathering of statistics.255 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
251 Ch 2 sec 4 – 6 SFS 1927:333.  
252 With the exception of the change in 2011 when the law was changed from “show” the 
passport to “submit” passport. 
253 HYDÉN and LUNDBERG p. 13. 
254 Statistics on Internal Control of Foreigners 2007 – 2014. 
255 LEANDER p. 8.  
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Table 1: Controls per year by respective police unit256 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total: 10 202 17 185 28 092 33 630 36640 42 467 28 930 26 428 
Aliens unit257 7 490 11 281 18 308 21 254 21 254 24 868 15 840 12 229 
Traffic unit 177 591 979 1244 2 502 2552 1 837 1662 
Criminal unit 229 500 466 695 333 269 428 853 
Other unit 2 352 4 812 830 10 416 12 551 14 778 10 825 11 684 
  
The aliens department performs more controls than the Traffic Department.  
 
In table 2 we see the total number of control and then whatever action has 
been taken following it. The numbers in the first columns between 2007-2010 
do not match in table 1 and table 2, but there were no explanation for this in 
connection to the statistics. 
 
Table 2: Outcome of control  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Result in total: 5 301 16 272 27 517 32 865 36 640 42 467 28 930 26 428 
No further 
action 
4 644 13 243 21 129 27 177 29 694 34 342 23140 21 818 
Enforcement/ 
Removal 
209 747 1 662 1 478 1 368 1 213 1 099 1 272 
To Migration 
Board 
 529 785 775 682 670 831 1 169 
Other action 448 2 151 3 941 3 463 4 896 6 242 3 860 2 169 
 
The majority of the checks do not lead to any further action. It can be 
discussed how efficient the controls are in relation to the cost of the controls, 
a question of proportionality. 
 
If an officer finds an alien without authorization, but without a pending 
removal decision or any other requested action according to SIS, they are 
meant to ensure that they apply for authorization with the Migration Board.258 
Since 1981it has not been possible to apply for a residence permit when you 
are inside the country. As a general rule, the same goes for work permits (ch. 
6 sec. 4 of the Aliens Act). If you are already inside the country unauthorized, 
the main legal option you have to legalize your status is to seek asylum or 
subsidiary protection.  
                                               
256 Statistics on Internal Control of Foreigners 2007 – 2014. 
257 Utlänningsenhet. 
258 SOU 2002:69 p. 75. 
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7.2' Intensified' internal' control' –' how' and'
why?'
7.2.1' Background'
Up until around 1996, migration control policy was mostly reactive. 
Migration policies were considered first after the arrival of large immigrant 
groups.259 It was also pragmatic, meaning that when something didn’t work, it 
was changed. The change happened in practice first and afterwards it was 
legally regulated.260 In 1996, the discussion changed. Immigration policy was 
no longer to be thought of as an isolated phenomenon. Instead it was to be 
considered inside a framework of “foreign policy, security policy, trade 
policy and development policy” and it was supposed to be active.261 The same 
tendencies can be seen in the example of internal control of foreigners.  
 
The perceived necessity of increased controls is in large attributed to 
Sweden’s accession to the Schengen Agreement. I will therefore in short 
explain the background of the Schengen cooperation. After, I will go through 
relevant government reports and preparatory work that discuss the use of 
internal control of foreigners and how the use is justified. 
7.2.2' Schengen'was'born'
In 1985, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg made 
an intergovernmental agreement to phase out border controls and develop 
police and legal co-operation. In 1990, the Schengen Implementation 
Agreement was signed. It contained practical measures for realization of the 
Convention, such as abolition of border controls and other co-operation 
measures. Sweden joined in 1996 262 , but it was not until 2001 Sweden 
became an operative member.263 This was because Sweden agreed with the 
majority interpretation of art. 7(a) of the Schengen Convention, that 
compensatory measure was necessary in order to abolish the internal 
borders.264 The legislative changes needed in the Swedish law to fulfill this 
obligation started in 1996 and was not finished until 2000. 
 With the Amsterdam Treaty the Schengen cooperation became part of 
EU-law.265 This also meant that questions of border control, free movement 
of persons, immigration policy and refugee policy were moved to the “first 
pillar” of EU-law. However, criminal law and police cooperation aimed at 
fighting crime stayed within the third pillar.266   
                                               
259 HAMMAR p. 193. 
260 HAMMAR p. 194. 
261 HAMMAR p. 193. 
262 Prop. 2014/15:32 p. 11. 
263 SOU 2006:9 p. 131. 
264 Prop. 1996/97:25 under chapter 8.2. Svensk migrationspolitik i globalt perspektiv. 
265 Prop. 1999/2000:64 p. 34. 
266 Prop. 1997/98:159 pp. 18-19. 
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 Today, 22 of the 28 European countries have joined the Schengen 
Agreement. Furthermore, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein 
have acceded the treaty without being EU-members.267 
7.2.3' Free'movement'and'crime'fighting'
The Schengen cooperation has two basic ideas that are tightly linked. The 
first is the free movement of people. This means that all internal borders 
inside the Schengen Area should be abolished. The second idea is that this 
should not increase the likelihood of and opportunities for transnational crime 
and “illegal” immigration. 268  To attain the second objective, certain 
“compensatory measures” should be implemented. One of them is the 
Schengen Information System (SIS).269  Another compensatory measure is 
increased police and legal cooperation between the countries.270 I will go 
through the Schengen Information System in the next chapter and outline its 
importance from a crimmigration standpoint. 
7.2.4' New'threats'
In 1997, Cyprus, seven Central- and Eastern European countries and the 
Baltic States had applied for admission into the EU. 271  With the new 
candidate countries and no internal borders came new challenges. These 
issues were partly addressed in the government reports SOU 1997:159 “An 
Enlarged European Union with Freedom, Security and Justice”272 and SOU 
1997:128 “Enforcement and Control in Alien Matters”273. Two “threats” were 
recognized: a majority of the new countries were transit countries for “illegal 
immigration”274 and organized crime was widespread.275 It was estimated that 
there were around 2 million “illegal aliens” residing in the EU at the time. 
Since border control was abolished, internal control of foreigners had to be 
intensified.276  
 Prop. 1997/98:42, “The Schengen Cooperation” followed up on the 
worries discussed in the two reports. Regarding internal control of foreigners, 
The National Police Board underlined the need for an intensified internal 
control considering the amount of “illegal aliens” residing inside the 
European Union. 277  The government agreed with this. The government 
concluded that a functioning internal control was a condition for open 
borders.278  
 
                                               
267 Prop. 2014/15:32 p. 11. 
268 Prop. 1999/2000:64 p. 38. 
269 Prop. 1999/2000:64 p. 38. 
270 Prop. 1999/2000:64 p. 40. 
271 The countries all joined the European Union in 2004. 
272 SOU 1997:159 Ett utvidgat europeiskt område med FRIHET, SÄKERHET och 
RÄTTVISA.  
273 SOU 1997:128 Verkställighet och kontroll i utlänningsärenden. 
274 SOU 1997:159 p. 17. 
275 SOU 1997:159 p. 20. 
276 SOU 1997:159 p. 14. 
277 Prop. 1997/98:42 p. 49.  
278 Prop. 1997/98:42 pp. 49-50. 
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7.2.5' A'compensatory'measure'
The importance of compensatory measures instead of internal frontiers is 
underlined in the Schengen legislation. In many of the preparatory works and 
government reports internal control of foreigners are described as a 
“compensatory measure”, just like the Schengen Information System (SIS) 
and the cooperation between the police.279 However, there is no obligation in 
the Schengen Borders Code for states to perform internal control of foreigners 
on the territory, instead it is designed as a right. In the Schengen Borders 
Code art. 21, checks within the territory are regulated. It says that the 
abolition of internal borders shall not affect exercise of police powers in 
relation to and away from the border as long as they do not have border 
control as the objective.  For interventions from the police to be allowed, it 
has to combat cross-border crime, the interventions cannot be systematic and 
they have to be designed as spot check. The article wishes to clarify that the 
abolition of internal borders does not mean that all police work has to stop in 
connection to the borders as long as it is performed as “normal” police work. 
 Despite the fact that internal control of foreigners is not a requirement 
in the Schengen Border Code, Sweden have other obligations. The Schengen 
Convention, art. 23, required member states to expel “illegal aliens” from 
their territory. This provision was replaced by the Returns Directive280 that 
regulates the return, voluntarily or forced, of unauthorized third-country 
nationals. In art. 8 of the directive it is stated “member states shall take all 
necessary measures to enforce the return decision”. The directive also 
regulates the use of detention to avoid absconding.281 The directive is a result 
of the European Council’s calls “for the establishment of an effective removal 
and repatriation policy, based on common standards, for persons to be 
returned in a humane manner and with full respect for their fundamental 
rights and dignity”282. The directive does not mention internal control of 
foreigners but an efficient return policy requires that undocumented migrants 
be found. In practice, internal control of foreigners often take place for the 
purpose of finding people facing removal decision in order to enforce 
these.283 
7.2.6' Summary'
The Schengen Agreement is meant to ensure free movement inside of the 
Schengen Area. The abolition of internal borders has been followed by a fear 
of increased crime and increased “illegal” immigration. Internal control of 
foreigners has been one of the Swedish government’s responses to this 
perceived threat. Furthermore, all member states have an obligation to expel 
                                               
279 See e.g. prop. 2003/04:35 p. 24; SOU 2010:63, p. 315; sec. 4 in RPSFS 2011:4, FAP 273-
1; SOU 2010:5 p. 94. 
280 Art. 21 in Directive 2008/115/EC of 16 December 2008 on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 
24.12.2008 (The Returns Directive). 
281 Art. 15(1) The Returns Directive. 
282 Preamble (2) The Returns Directive. 
283 Prop. 2004:110 p.124. 
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foreigners who are residing on the territory unauthorized. The controls are 
also described as a “compensatory measure” meant to replace borders.  
7.3' Increased' importance' of' efficient'
implementation'
As concluded above, the accession of the Schengen Agreement led to 
political discussions regarding border control, migration and crime fighting. 
There was a perceived need for intensified internal control of foreigners. In 
prop. 1999/2000:64 there was a discussion regarding a suggested lowering of 
the threshold for controls in order to ensure efficiency, and before this there 
had been multiple official documents284  calling for an intensified internal 
control. 
 SOU 2004:110 “Border Control Act – a more efficient border 
control”285 was one of government reports and preparatory works meant to 
evaluate border control in the new reality of Schengen. The report found that 
the internal control of foreigners was inadequate. Almost exclusively were 
controls performed by those local departments that had a separate “aliens 
unit” (utlänningsenhet). 286  In other police departments, enforcement of 
removal decisions was the only prioritized task and no other general controls 
were performed.287 The report suggested that all the relevant rules concerning 
border control were to be brought together in a new act called the Border 
Control Act. The proposal did not lead to a proposition regarding a new law. 
 Neither prop. 1999/2000:64 or SOU 2004:110 led to any legal 
changes.288 But there were still a perceived need for intensified control. The 
executive branch now stepped in.  
 
In September 2006, the National Police Board initiated a project group meant 
to develop a national strategy for internal control of foreigners. The reason 
was that another nine countries were about to join the European Union before 
2008, many of them Eastern European countries.289 In 2007, the National 
Police Board decided that all internal controls were to be documented. 290  
 In 2009, in Sweden, the Police Authority, the Migration Board and the 
Swedish Prison and Probation Service all received the same assignment in 
their respective appropriation directions291: together they were to review the 
procedure for enforcement of removal decisions. When this was done, they 
were to institute the necessary measures to increase the enforcement rate.292  
                                               
284 SOU 1997:128; SOU 1997:159; Prop. 1997/98:42. 
285 SOU 2004:110 Gränskontrollag – effektivare gränskontroll. 
286 SOU 2004:110 p. 421. 
287 SOU 2004:110 p. 422. 
288 I return to the discussion of a lowered threshold in prop. 1999/2000:64 in ch. 8.5, and the 
discussion in SOU 2004:110 in the next section. 
289 ASK 2006/07:528. 
290 Statistics on Internal Control of Foreigners 2007 – 2014. 
291 Regleringsbrev. 
292 ”Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2009 avseende Migrationsverket” Ju2008/942/SIM ch. 3; 
”Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2009 avseende Rikspolisstyrelsen och övriga myndigheter 
inom polisorganisationen, Ju2008/8581/PO ch. 3; ”Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2009 
avseende Kriminalvården” Ju2008/10579/KRIM ch. 3. 
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One of the outcomes of this was “REVA”, (Rättssäkert och Effektivt 
Verkställighetsarbete). Translated it stands for Legally Secure and Efficient 
Enforcement. REVA gained a lot of media attention, and were, somewhat 
wrongfully, understood as internal control of foreigners.  
 In the project description of REVA internal control of foreigners was 
never mentioned. Instead, REVA streamlined and laid down rules for co-
operation between different authorities in order to enhance the number of 
enforced removals. However, in practice, an increase in the number of 
controls increases the number of apprehensions of immigrants facing 
removals, thus resulting in an upsurge of removals. The connection between 
REVA and internal control of foreigners is not explicit, but they are 
interlinked.293   
 
Before the appropriation letter and REVA, there was a small group inside the 
Police that worked with internal control of foreigners and enforcement of 
removal decisions. Now, all police officers in all branches of the Police were 
to conduct internal control of foreigners in connection to other police 
interventions.294 This practice itself was not something new, it was prescribed 
in the earlier police instructions as well,295 but it was rarely carried out. The 
new requirement also meant that all police officers should receive necessary 
training on how to perform the controls.296 
 In the instructions from the National Police Board, the importance of 
controls as a compensatory measure since the abolition of border control is 
underlined. The controls are necessary to maintain the free movement of 
people inside the Schengen Area. 297  
7.3.1' Children’s'right'to'education''
Despite political calls for strengthening of internal control there has been one 
change in domestic legislation that has run counter to this development.  
 In 2012 the Government proposed to change the rules concerning 
education for children staying in the country unauthorized. They were to have 
the same right to education, both primary and secondary school, as Swedish 
children. 298  At the same time, the authorities subject to the reporting 
obligation (anmälningsskyldighet) according to 7 ch. 1 sec. of The Aliens 
Ordinance (2006:97) were decreased. Except the Tax Agency and the 
Swedish Employment Center, the obligation used to cover schools and Social 
Welfare Committee as well.  The obligation meant that the concerned 
authorities had to report to the police when in contact with an alien without 
authorization. The school and Social service were now to be exempt from this 
requirement. 299 
                                               
293 See LEANDER.  
294 LEANDER p. 8; para 4 RPSFS 2011:4, FAP 273-1. 
295 RPSFS 1986:3, FAP 273-1 
296 Leander, p. 8; 4 § RPSFS 2011:4, FAP 273-1. 
297 Para 4 RPSFS 2011:4, FAP 273-1. 
298 Prop. 2012/13:58 p.1. 
299 Prop. 2012/13:58 p. 28a. 
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 The government concluded that this change did lead to a weakening of 
the internal control of foreigners. However, this was weighed against the 
interest of the child’s right to education, which weighed greater.300   
7.3.2' Summary'
The new challenges and obligations brought on by Sweden’s accession of the 
Schengen Agreement had to be addressed and solved. One solution was that 
internal control of foreigners had to be strengthened. However, proposed 
legislative changes were turned down. Instead, the government and the 
National Police Board changed the implementation of the controls. Controls 
were to happen in connection to all police interventions and were to be 
carried out by all police units. Despite the strong need for an intensified 
control, children’s right to education weighed greater than the controls. 
7.4' Crime^fighting'tool'
In the previous sections I have gone through the official documents that 
describe the controls as a sort of replacement of internal borders. There is 
however another way of looking at internal control of foreigners that has been 
brought up in preparatory works and government reports. That is to regard 
internal control of foreigners as a crime-fighting tool, just like any other 
investigative tool, such as coercive measures or preliminary investigations. 
The tools can then be used interchangeable regardless of the purpose of the 
measure. This is what Sklansky would call ad-hoc instrumentalism: adopting 
the most fitting enforcement instrument in each situation from different areas 
of law.301 This way of thinking of controls can be justified by the fact that 
unauthorized stay in the country is considered a crime.302 Now, I do not refer 
to the fact that the immigrant is “illegal”, this notion is presupposed in almost 
all preparatory works I have read. The “illegality” refers to the status of the 
immigrant.303 I refer to the fact the presence of a person without legal status is 
deemed a criminal offense.   
 
In my study of preparatory works and government reports I have found three 
examples of official documents that underline how internal control should put 
in relation to the Police’s overall duty to fight crime.304 
 SOU 2002:69 “Human smuggling and victims of human 
trafficking”305 clearly linked internal control of foreigners to other kinds of 
police duties. The report stated that a variety of laws and measures, for 
                                               
300 Prop. 2012/13:58 p. 30. 
301 Sklansky p. 200; I have also gone through ad-hoc instrumentalism in ch. 2.3.2.1.  
302 Ch. 5.1.1.  
303 One could argue that mentioning “illegal immigration” and “organized crime” in the same 
sentence (see e.g. SOU 1997:156) implicates immigration in a crime-narrative. While this 
may be true, this is not what I have looked for. 
304 There are two preparatory works in the beginning of the 1970s (prop.1973:37 and prop. 
1975/76:18) that link internal control of foreigners to combatting terrorism. My focus is on 
the legal development over the last 20 years and I have left those out. Furthermore, the 
terrorist legislation was moved out of the Aliens Act in 1989 because it was deemed outside 
of the scope of immigration law (Prop. 1988/89:86 p. 50). 
305 SOU 2002:69 Människosmuggling och offer för människohandel. 
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example the Criminal Code and the Police Act, coercive measures and 
investigative rules, and special rules about police control such as the Road 
Traffic Law306 open up for a variety of available measures to fight illegal 
immigration and human smuggling. The following quote exemplify how the 
report understood the laws as instruments used to reach the overarching 
objective: 
 
“For example, the Criminal Code and the Police Act support a request 
for identification on justifiable grounds, the Code of Judicial 
Procedure give the option to carry out a body search, the Aliens Act 
support investigation of an alien’s identity and the Road Traffic Law 
can motivate control of vehicles on the grounds of traffic security 
reasons and the driver, e.g. is asked for identification. Internal control 
of foreigner may not only be carried out separately, but also as a part 
of the total, crime preventive work.”307 
 
This section has clear similarities to Sklansky’s notion of ad-hoc 
instrumentalism. Sklansky argues that this view is accepted because the focus 
lies on what works in order to the most important aim: fighting crime.308 
 SOU 2004:110 connects internal control of foreigners to crime control 
instead of merely mentioning it as a way of controlling migration or as an 
enforcement tool. Because a number of immigration violations are 
criminalized, the report suggested that these violations should be handled as 
such. If this view of immigration violations were adopted, other measures 
accepted in preliminary investigations should be used more regularly.309 The 
report suggested that the law should require suspicion of a crime against the 
Aliens Act or human smuggling for the control to be carried out. This would 
clarify when controls could be carried out. The change would not lead to an 
actual change of the threshold for initiating control; “reason to assume” is the 
threshold for both initiating preliminary investigations and controls. This 
would also make sure that crimes against the Aliens Act were not investigated 
or dealt with any differently than other crimes.310 The proposal did not lead to 
any legislative changes.  
 Prop.  2012/13:125 implemented the Sanctions Directive 311  in 
Swedish law. In the proposition internal control is closely linked to 
criminalization of unauthorized work in ch. 20 sec. 3 and 5 of the Aliens Act. 
Because these crimes fall under public prosecution, it is the police’s job to 
observe, to carry out surveillance and to investigate suspected criminal 
offences. If the Police in their work find a person who they have reason to 
assume is staying in the country illegally, they should initiate an 
investigation. The Government then says that after an investigation is initiated 
                                               
306 Vägtrafiklag. 
307 SOU 2002:69 p. 212. 
308 SKLANSKY p. 200. 
309 SOU 2004:110 p. 426. 
310 SOU 2004:110 p. 426. 
311 Directive 2009/52/EC providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures 
against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals OJ L 168 30.6.2008 (Sanctions 
Directive). 
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control- and coercive measures regulated in the Swedish Code of Judicial 
Procedure may be used.312 
 
7.4.1' Summary'
SOU 2002:69 and prop. 2012/13:125 both dealt with criminal issues: human 
smuggling and employer sanctions against unauthorized work. The controls 
are then underlined as an extra tool that may be used to combat this particular 
type of crime. When a person is deemed “dangerous” or criminal, the tools 
should be used interchangeably regardless if the aim is administrative or 
investigative. SOU 2004:110 is different, because its aim was to look at 
border control at large, with clear instructions to take into account both the 
crime preventive perspective and the migration perspective.313 SOU 2004:110 
underlined the need to investigate the crimes according to the Code of 
Judicial Procedure and the importance of rule of law.314 This line of thinking 
is absent in SOU 2002:69 and prop. 2012/13:125, maybe because an act 
deemed a criminal offense justifies the use of public power where all 
measures are allowed.  
7.5' Concluding'remarks'
In this chapter I have gone through the political development and the political 
discourse that have lead to and affected the current implementation of the 
controls.  
 Sweden’s accession to the Schengen Agreement has been the main 
official motivation for intensification of the controls. There are two rationales 
used in this reasoning. First, controls are seen as a compensatory measure and 
due to international obligations Sweden has to perform controls. The second 
rationale is the limitation of border control, which has created new kinds of 
threats and challenges. Those threats are partly increased illegal immigration 
and partly increased transnational crime. Increasing internal control is 
necessary in order to have open borders. Here, the controls are used to replace 
the internal border. I have also described how the lack of legal changes has 
led the intensification of the controls to take place mainly in the 
implementation. Controls should now take be performed by all police officers 
in their everyday work. The third way of describing and justifying the 
controls is to describe them as a crime-fighting tool like any other.  
 
The question is if any of these or all rationales can be described as part of a 
crimmigration-trend? If we look at the presumption that is the fundament of 
the Schengen area: free movement and increased police and judicial 
cooperation to combat crime, this tightly links immigration control with crime 
control. This framing of the problem description fosters a solution that relies 
on a combination of the administrative-criminal sphere rather than strict 
application of administrative rules and administrative actors. Furthermore, 
                                               
312 Prop. 2012/13:125 p. 113. 
313 SOU 2004:110 p. 47. 
314 SOU 2004:110 p. 426. 
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internal control of foreigners is directly described as one of the weapons of 
choice used to fight crime and illegal aliens. It is not explained why this is, it 
is just underlined as an important corner stone in maintaining the Schengen 
area. 
 The police’s involvement and implementation of controls has not 
legislatively been part of a “trend” since internal control of foreigners is not 
new, but the increased attention to controls is something new. The Schengen 
Cooperation directly relies on furthered police and judicial cooperation to 
fight transnational crime and illegal aliens, so it can be expected that police 
presence in immigration control will only increase.  
 The clearest connection to crimmigration is however when the 
controls are described as a crime-fighting tool. This is what Sklansky would 
refer to as ad-hoc instrumentalism. The controls are clearly linked to the 
criminal sphere.  
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8' Legal'scope'of'the'controls'
In the previous chapter I looked at the development of the controls from a 
political point of view. In this chapter I look at the actual provision and the 
established law that regulate internal control of foreigners: ch. 9 sec. 9 in the 
Aliens Act. The main question I try to answer is how and when a control can 
be performed. I go through who can be subject to the control, grounds for a 
control and documentation requirement for the controls. I will start by 
presenting the section315 governing internal control of foreigners.  
 
In this chapter I continuously refer to a number of sources. The first worth 
mentioning is the instructions on how internal control of foreigners is to be 
implemented from 2011 from the National Police Board, RPSFS 2011:4 FAP 
273-1. 316  The second source is Sophia Hydén and Anna Lundberg’s 
dissertation “Internal control of foreigners in Policework – between the rule 
of law and efficiency in Sweden’s Schengen”317 (2004). The third source is 
the supervision report conducted by the The National Police Board on the 
internal control of foreigners in 2013. This resulted in Tillsynsrapport 
2014:14 318 . The last one I will mention is a report from Aréna Idé, a 
progressive think thank, that looked at the practice and routine of the controls 
in ”Guilty until the opposite is proven – an examination of the Police’s 
internal control of foreigners”319. 
8.1' Established'legislation'
Chapter 9 section 9 in the Swedish Aliens Act (2005:751) prescribes:  
 
“It is the duty of an alien staying in Sweden, when requested to do so by a 
police officer, to submit a passport or other documents showing that he or she 
has the right to remain in Sweden. It is also the duty of the alien, when 
summoned by the Swedish Migration Board or the police authority, to visit 
the Board or the authority and provide information about his or her stay in 
this country. If the alien does not do so the policy authority may collect him 
or her. If, in view of an alien’s personal circumstance or for some other 
reason, it can be assumed that the alien will not obey the summons, he or she 
may be collected without prior summons. 
[…] 
                                               
315 I do not mention the second paragraph of the section that refers to the Coastal Guards 
responsibility for the controls since this outside of the scope of this essay. 
316 This can be found in their Statutes book. It replaced the instructions from 1986, RPSFS 
1986:3, FAP 273-1. 
317 Inre utlänningskontroll i polisarbete: mellan rättsstatsideal och effektivitet i Schengens 
Sverige. 
318 Tillsynsrapport 2014:14 "Inre Utlänningskontroll”. 
319 LEANDER. 
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Controls under the first and second paragraphs may only be undertaken if 
there is well-founded reason to assume that the foreigner lacks the right to 
remain in this country or there is otherwise special cause for control.”320 
8.1.1' Who'can'be'subject'to'the'control?'
The provision states that the duty to submit passport or documents to support 
the individual’s right to stay in the country applies to aliens. I use the term 
alien and foreigner interchangeably throughout this essay. A foreigner is any 
person who is not a Swedish citizen. However, in the immigration law special 
rules apply to citizens of member states in the European Union, in the 
European Economic Association (EEA) and Schengen States. As an example, 
the requirement to carry a passport when entering Sweden does not apply to 
citizens of Schengen states if they travel directly from another Schengen state 
(ch. 2 sec. 8 of the Aliens Act). Citizens of EEA-states have the right to 
residence in a number of situations according to ch. 3 a sec. 3 of the Aliens 
Act. This means that in practice, “foreigner” often refers to what EU-law 
labels a “third-country national”. A third country national is any person who 
is not a citizen of the European Union within the meaning of art. 17(1) of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community321 and who is not a person 
enjoying the Community right of free movement, as defined in art. 2(5) of the 
Schengen Borders Code.  
8.1.2' Duties'of'the'foreigner'
The paragraph refers only to foreigners; therefore only foreigners are bound 
by this obligation. The general rule is that an alien entering or staying in 
Sweden must have a passport (Ch. 2 sec. 1 of the Aliens Act). As stated 
earlier, there are exceptions to this general rule. Citizens of a Schengen-state 
that travels directly from another Schengen state do not need to carry a 
passport. (Ch. 2 sec. 1 Aliens Ordinance). Neither does a foreigner with a 
permanent residence permit need a passport while remaining in the country 
(Ch. 2 sec. 1 of the Aliens Ordinance). A foreigner exempt from the passport 
requirement need to show that this exemption applies to him or her and 
therefore has to identify him or herself when entering or staying in the 
country (Ch. 2 sec. 3 of the Aliens Ordinance). The preparatory works have 
stated that the foreigner is not required to always carry around his passport.322 
                                               
320 My own translation. The original section reads: ”En utlänning som vistas i Sverige är 
skyldig att på begäran av en polisman överlämna pass eller andra handlingar som visar att 
han eller hon har rätt att uppehålla sig i Sverige. Utlänningen är också skyldig att efter 
kallelse av Migrationsverket eller Polismyndigheten komma till verket eller myndigheten och 
lämna uppgifter om sin vistelse här i landet. Om utlänningen inte gör det, får han eller hon 
hämtas genom Polismyndighetens försorg. Om det på grund av en utlännings personliga 
förhållanden eller av någon annan anledning kan antas att utlänningen inte skulle följa 
kallelsen, får han eller hon hämtas utan föregående kallelse. 
[…] 
Kontroll enligt första och andra styckena får vidtas endast om det finns grundad anledning 
att anta att utlänningen saknar rätt att uppehålla sig här i landet eller om det annars finns 
särskild anledning till kontroll. Lag (2014:655).” 
321 Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ C 325, 24.12.2002, p. 33–184. 
322 Prop. 1988/89:86 p. 172. 
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In reality, a person who is found without identification is escorted by the 
police officers to the place where those documents can be found. This means 
that in practice everyone staying in the country has a duty to show documents 
supporting this right.323 
8.1.3' Implementation'of'the'controls'
To be able to assess the full nature of the controls I not only look at the 
established law, but also at how the controls are being carried out. In the 
chapter before I described how controls are to be carried out in all branches of 
the Police Authority’s work. This meant that police officers shall carry out 
controls when intervening for example in theft, shoplifting or assault 
matters.324 In the report from Aréna Idé, the controls are described like this: 
 
”When a police carry out an internal control of foreigners they ask for 
identification documents. If the person who is being controlled does 
not have this, the officer asks for the personal number that is checked 
against the register of births, marriages and deaths 
(folkbokföringsregistret). The Police also have access to a centralized 
record that all members of Schengen can search in, Schengen 
Information System (SIS). In SIS there is information on people who 
are not allowed to remain in Schengen. The police can also search in 
the Migration Board’s case management system.”325 
 
Tillsynsrapport 2014:14 found that both border units and officers in external 
duty perform controls. They also found that the majority of the controls done 
by officers in external duty are done in connection to traffic controls,326 even 
if this does not reflect the statistics. 327  In one of the districts the Police 
authority said that the majority of controlled people are not aware that they 
are being checked.328 This is because it might start as a driver check and then 
transcend into a control without the person being notified. Tillsynsrapport 
concluded that the violation of integrity was “minimal” because it only 
contained a search in SIS, and if there were no further actions taken, that was 
it.329  
 The Parliamentary Ombudsman (Justitieombudsmannen) (JO) has 
stated that the Police shall behave in a respectful and dignified way when 
performing the controls. The officer should also aim at thoroughly explaining 
the matter in a calm and considerate manner. The officer also has to take the 
applicable principles into account: the principle of proportionality and 
necessity.330 
 In the following section I will discuss the grounds for the control and 
how this has been interpreted and criticized in legislative documents.  
                                               
323 HYDÉN and LUNDBERG p. 100. 
324 LEANDER p. 7. 
325 LEANDER p. 11. 
326 Tillsynsrapport 2014:14 p. 23. 
327 See ch.7.1. 
328 Tillsynsrapport 2014:14  p. 18. 
329 Tillsynsrapport 2014:14 p. 23. 
330 JO dnr 762 - 1980. 
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8.1.4' Grounds'for'control'
There are two different grounds for control set out in the provision in sec. 9 
ch. 9 in the Aliens Act. The first is ”well founded reason to assume” that a 
person is staying on the territory unauthorized and the second is ”special 
cause for control”. In the following sections I will cover the established 
legislation, the implementation, and the criticism the legislation has received. 
 
8.1.4.1' Interpreting'“well^founded'reason'to'assume”'
It is not explained how “well-founded reason to assume” should be 
interpreted in the preparatory works. However, “reason to assume” is the 
same threshold as the threshold for initiating preliminary investigations so 
some guidance could probably be gathered from that. It is the lowest 
threshold in procedural law.331  
 In prop. 2012/13:125 that implemented the Sanctions Directive in the 
Swedish legislation, internal controls of foreigners were mentioned. The 
government stated that if there is not enough suspicion of a crime to initiate 
an investigation, but there is reason to assume that an alien is staying 
unauthorized on the territory, the police may carry out an internal control.332 
Considering that the threshold for initiating a criminal investigation and the 
threshold for the control is the same, this conclusion is an incorrect 
interpretation of the law. It is troubling that the Government expresses this 
kind of interpretation because it significantly lowers the threshold for 
controls. SOU 2004:110 suggested that the provision should be changed so a 
control could only be performed when there was a suspicion of a crime 
against the Aliens Act. This would not change the law, just clarify that these 
crimes should not be investigated differently than other crimes. 333  The 
interpretation of the law in prop. 2012/13:125 sadly implicates that the 
concern expressed by SOU 2004:110 could have bearing.  
 Hydén and Lundberg found that the police officers carrying out 
internal control of foreigners set the threshold for intervention very low, or at 
least they did not offer any explanation for their interventions when 
documenting the control.334  
 
In the preparatory work from 1989, it is said that the foreigner’s conduct or 
company sometimes may give reason to believe that he or she doesn’t have 
the right to stay in the country. A control measure might then be 
performed.335  In the Instructions from the National Police Board in sec. 5, 
“reason to assume” is commented on. Under “general advice” it is stated that  
“well-founded reason to assume” means that a control only may take place 
after a comprehensive assessment of the objective circumstances founded on 
the police officer’s individual observation, investigation, obtained 
intelligence, and other reliable information. However, the control may not 
happen solely because someone has an appearance that might be perceived as 
                                               
331 Ch. 6.3. 
332 Prop. 2012/13:125 p. 113. 
333 SOU 2004:110 p. 426. 
334 HYDÉN and LUNDBERG p. 94. 
335 Prop. 1988/89:86 p. 173. 
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“foreign”, or because of somebody’s language or name.  JO has underlined 
that controls cannot take place solely because someone has an appearance that 
is perceived as “foreign”.336 
 In Hydén and Lundberg’s dissertation Police officers express that a 
control cannot take place based on appearance, but that appearance, language, 
nervousness together can constitute basis for control. One officer explained 
that if they see a dark skinned person, they might initiate a conversation with 
the person. If he then speaks English, it can be reason enough to conduct a 
control.337  
 In the instruction it is further stated that criminal intelligence or other 
information may be used to put together well-founded profiles. Such profiles, 
alone or together with other information, can be used as grounds for a control. 
 
In Tillsynsrapport 2014:14 they found that well-grounded reason to assume is 
problematic. It is mainly the border police units that carry out this type of 
control. It can be initiated based on information and tip-offs from the public. 
When there is concrete information the police can make their own 
assessment. However, when there is no information, it is almost impossible 
for the police officer to tell a foreigner from a citizen only based on language, 
clothes or appearance. This they said opens up a strong risk for 
discrimination. Therefore, the report suggested that FAP 273-1 is changed to 
underline that language, appearance, and name are not enough grounds for 
control.338 
 Hydén and Lundberg noted that when the Police officers tried to 
describe how they selected people for controls, their answers were very 
vague. Often officers referred to gut feeling and intuition.339 Compare this 
with suspicion of a crime and the threshold for initiating a preliminary 
investigation. For a preliminary investigation to be initiated there has to be 
some evidentiary fact of a substantial crime.340 It is highly unlikely that gut 
feeling or intuition would constitute enough reason to initiate a preliminary 
investigation. A gut feeling would instead probably lead to further 
surveillance or another stage before the investigation is started.341 However, 
the requirement for carrying out a control is still “reason to assume”, thus it 
cannot be used for surveillance purposes.  
 
8.1.4.2' Interpreting' “otherwise' special' cause' for'
control”'
In the instructions from the National Police Board they also comment on  
“otherwise special cause for controls”. This, they say, “ought to”/”should”342 
be applicable when there is grounds for a control in connection with a 
criminal investigation or deprivation of liberty. It can also be used when there 
                                               
336 JO dnr 762 – 1980. 
337 HYDÉN and LUNDBERG p. 99. 
338 Tillsynsrapport 2014:14 p. 25a. 
339 HYDÉN and LUNDBERG p. 99.  
340 Ch. 6.3. 
341 Ch. 6.3. 
342 Translation from ”bör”, which means something should be the case, even if they might not 
be certain. 
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is a control of vehicles or drivers. When performing such a control, a 
passenger should be controlled as well if there are objective grounds for it.343 
This kind of implementation of the law have distinct similarities to the 
enforcement practices of law enforcement agencies in the United States 
where they prescribe mandatory checks against immigration registers for all 
detained or stopped people.344 
 It is noticeable that they use the word “ought to” instead of “can”. 
This gives the impression that they are not quite sure if this is the case or not. 
They also specify that the passenger should be controlled as well when 
performing a driver check, if there is reason to do so. Why this has to be 
specified I am not sure. If there are objective grounds, a control should be 
allowed anywhere. This could instead be a reminder to police officers to take 
the opportunity to perform a control.  
 
Tillsynsrapport 2014:14 found that most of the controls are performed based 
on the second prerequisite, “otherwise special cause for control”. They said 
that because of the way the regulations are formulated there is a small risk of 
racial or ethnic profiling based on appearance, language and name. It is used 
when there is another reason for checking somebody’s identity (regardless of 
the person being a foreigner), because the control is initiated for some other 
reason.345  
 
SOU 2002:69 said that controls based on information on common routes used 
for illegal immigration in Europe could constitute grounds under the 
prerequisite “other special cause for control”. This, it was said, would mean 
that controls would happen based on well-grounded, put-together profiles and 
those who match this profile or other information in connection with the 
profile.346 It is hard to not see that this suggestion follows a “crime fighting” 
way of thinking where traditional law enforcement tactics are used against 
unauthorized immigration. The following preparatory work (prop. 
2003/04:35) did not comment on this or any other opinion expressed by the 
report in relation to internal control of foreigners. 
8.1.5' Questioning'the'legal'basis'for'performing'
controls'
As I mentioned in ch. 7.3 the threshold for the controls was discussed in prop. 
1999/2000:64. The discussion stemmed from a suggestion by the government 
report leading up to the preparatory work: SOU 1997:128 “Enforcement and 
Control in Alien Matters”347. The report pushed for a legislative change of the 
internal controls. They had found that the controls mainly occurred in 
connection to other Police interventions, and they questioned if all controls 
really took place because it could be assumed that the person lacked the right 
to stay in the country (the first prerequisite). The report was also hesitant 
concerning what legal basis the implementation had in the second 
                                               
343 Sec. 5 RPSFS 2011:4 FAP 273-1. 
344 Ch. 2.2.2. 
345 Tillsynsrapport 2014:14 p. 25a. 
346 SOU 2002:69 p. 259. 
347 SOU 1997:128 Verkställighet och kontroll i utlänningsärenden. 
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prerequisite, otherwise special cause for control, since it was unclear how it 
was to be interpreted. 348  
 Accompanying the concern for legal security, the report stressed the 
importance of an efficient internal control. They wanted the implementation 
of the controls to still be the same. Their solution was therefore to change the 
second prerequisite so the threshold for controls would not be set as high. 349 
They wanted to change it to “or if it for some other reasons appears justified 
to control him350”.351 The report also argued that controls in connection with 
other actions are less of an encroachment on a person’s integrity than if you 
just stop somebody on the street. 352 
 
The proposal from SOU 1997:128 received criticism from both JO and other 
consultative bodies (Remissinstansers353) for its lack of clarity and the risk for 
violation of integrity. The Legislative Council (Lagrådet354) had extensive 
criticism. They said that even if the proposal gives the impression that the 
control would take place because there is an actual reason for it (another 
reason than assumed non-authorized stay, whatever that might be, they asked 
themselves); this is not the intention. Instead, The Legislative Council argued 
that the proposal’s real intention was for controls to take place routinely, 
almost without restriction. A more honest version, according the Legislative 
Council, would be to implement controls whenever it is “not unjustified” to 
do so. The result would be a system resembling the French one, where 
foreigners need to carry their “papers” around everywhere.  
 It is interesting to note that the Legislative Council attributed this 
proposed tactic to the proposal in SOU 1997:128, whilst the report claimed to 
adjust itself after reality. Lagrådet did not comment on the report’s conclusion 
that the current implementation did not have legal basis.  
 
The Legislative Council then went on to discuss how the proposed change 
responded to the non-discrimination principle in the Instrument of 
Government in ch. 2 sec. 12. This provision also applies to foreigners 
according to ch. 2 sec. 25 IoG. They said that even if the wording of the law 
is neutral and non-discriminatory on its face, in practice it would be in breach 
of the non-discrimination principle. Because nationality cannot be 
distinguished by somebody’s ID or drivers license, the Legislative Council 
argued that controls often would take place because of a person’s race, 
ethnicity, skin color, or foreign name. The proposal would therefore, even if 
not formally, in practice be in breach of the non-discrimination clause of the 
IoG.355  
                                               
348 SOU 1997:128 p. 118.  
349 SOU 1997:128 p. 118. 
350 Own translation, original: ”eller om det annars framstår som befogat att kontrollera 
honom”. 
351 SOU 1997:128 p. 16. 
352 SOU 1997:128 p. 118. 
353 Body to which a proposed measure is referred (submitted) for consideration, which is 
always done with law proposals in Sweden. 
354 The Legislative Council perform so called ”judicial preview” on law proposals. 
Specifically they look at the legal security of the proposal and if it is in breach of any of the 
fundamental rights in the Instrument of Government. 
355 Prop. 1999/2000:64 p. 252. 
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The government agreed with the proposal that the invasion of integrity is less 
when the control is performed with other activities, without further explaining 
why. However, they understood the concerns expressed by the Legislative 
Council. Therefore, the government kept the provision unchanged.356  
 In this instance, it may seem like the non-discrimination principle won 
over efficiency in migration control. However, the concerns expressed in the 
report were never addressed. If the implementation did not have legal basis 
then it is hard to see that is does today. Furthermore, the Legislative Council 
did say that routine checks in all part of police work would mean there would 
be no restrictions and a system like the French one. Considering FAP 273-1 
that prescribes that controls should happen in connection to other activities 
without further specifying exactly how to assess when there is cause for a 
control, the provision opens up large room of discretion given to the police. 
 
SOU 2002:69 later stated that the objections from Lagrådet probably had 
more to do with the choice of words than the rationale of the need for more 
controls.357  
8.1.6' Documentation'of'the'control'
The 6th section of the Police Instructions regulates documentation of the 
control. The documentation should contain the grounds for the control, the 
time of the control, who was controlled, and who performed the control. The 
documentation should be arranged so it is easy to access it afterwards. If new 
information is gathered at the control, this information should be noted on the 
document.358 
 In 2007 the National Police Board decided that all controls should be 
documented. This is done in an event report with the code R209. Both 
Tillsynsrapport 2014:14 and the Aréna Idé report found that documentation 
does not live up to the standards set up in FAP 273-1. The grounds for the 
control are rarely declared and neither is the identity of the person checked.359 
For a person who has been controlled, the possibility to challenge this after or 
understand why he or she was being singled out is therefore very slim. 
8.2' Concluding'remarks'
The legislation has multiple grey areas. One of them is the definition of an 
alien. In Sweden an alien is anyone who is not a Swedish citizen, and in the 
Schengen area it is referred to as a “third-country national”.360  
 Another grey area is the unclear interpretation of what constitutes 
grounds for control. The last time the threshold was mentioned in a 
preparatory work, in prop. 2013/14:125, it was interpreted as being set below 
the threshold for initiating a preliminary investigation. This amount of 
                                               
356 Prop 1999/2000:64 p. 69. 
357 SOU 2002:69 p. 258. 
358 RPSFS 2011:4 FAP 273-1.p. 3. 
359 Tillsynsrapport 2014:14 p. 24. 
360 Ch. 8.1.1. 
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uncertainty leaves a great deal of discretion to the law enforcement officials. I 
have two comments regarding this. The first is that I doubt that the same 
amount of uncertainty would have been allowed if internal control of 
foreigners had been perceived strictly as a practice adopted for criminal 
matters. SOU 1997:128 and SOU 2004:1110 have both pushed for legislative 
changes in order to ensure that the interventions shall have legal basis.361 
Their concerns have not been addressed.  
 My second comment refers to what I discussed in the previous 
chapter. The importance of controls has been highlighted in numerous official 
documents. It has also been discussed as a general crime-fighting tool. The 
Police authority is put under political pressure to increase the number of 
removals, thus increasing the number of controls. Tillsynsrapport 2014:14 
even argued that there should be set goal for the number of controls that 
should be carried out.362 The political pressure together with the large amount 
of discretion given to officers opens up for interventions that value efficiency 
above the rule of law.  
   
                                               
361 SOU 1997:128 p. 118 discussed in ch. 8.1.5; SOU 2004:110 p. 426 discussed in ch. 7.4. 
362 Tillsynsrapport 2014:14 p. 27. 
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9' Criminal'law'as'an'instrument'
for'immigration'control'
One of my research questions is if the immigration enforcement relies on the 
criminal justice system. In chapter 4 I looked at criminalization of 
immigration violations, which is one way the criminal justice system can be 
used. In this section I have a broader understanding of the “criminal justice 
system”. This means that I look at traditionally “criminal” tools such as the 
right to detain, retention of biometric identifiers and large-scale technological 
databases, and how they are utilized in the control. I will also look at the legal 
basis for carrying out control in connection to other police interventions and 
how this can be understood in the crimmigration narrative. 
9.1' Coercive' measures' in' order' to' carry'
out'the'control'
In ch. 1 sec. 8 of the Aliens Act it is stated that the law should be applied in a 
manner that ensures that the freedom of foreigners is not limited to a greater 
extent than what is necessary in each individual case. A control is not 
considered a coercive measure in the Swedish sense, it is not regulated as 
such in the law. The 9th chapter of the Aliens Act is named “control- and 
coercive measures” indicating that these two measures are distinct. I start 
with reviewing the right for the Police to detain a person, a coercive measure, 
used in connection to internal control of foreigners. I will compare how these 
rules correspond to the rules of coercive measures implemented for 
investigative purposes. I then look at the usage of biometric identifiers in 
migration control. Biometric identifiers have commonly been used in criminal 
investigations but are now also used in migration control. 
9.1.1' Right'to'detain'
The first paragraph of the section on internal control of foreigners confers 
power to the Police to summon a person for an investigation, with or without 
prior summons. In the preparatory works it is said that bringing someone in 
without prior notice under the power of the Aliens Act should be used 
restrictively. It is the personal circumstances of the individual that should be 
considered when deciding if it’s appropriate or not.363 
 When a person cannot identify him- or herself they are often forced to 
allow the police officer to follow them home and show them the relevant 
documents.364 This could potentially be considered a restriction of liberty 
according art. 5(1) of the ECHR.365 In the Police Act, an unidentified person 
may be taken into preventive detention if there is special reason to assume 
that the individual is wanted or with support from law should be deprived of 
                                               
363 Prop. 1981/82:146 p. 66. 
364 HYDÉN and LUNDBERG.p. 100. 
365 See discussion in Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom, para 56 - 57. 
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his or her freedom of movement (sec. 14). “Special reason to assume” should 
according to the comment on the police act indicate that the officer has to be 
able to account for the reason for his or her suspicion.366 However, the officer 
do not have the recognize the wanted person, a conversation with the 
individual may lead the officer to suspect that he or she should be detained.367 
The provision refers to both criminal and administrative measures. In prop. 
1996/97:175 it was said that this rule has to be interpreted in a way that oblige 
all persons asked by the Police to identify themselves to comply. This 
principle was therefore not codified.368 
 If a person does not cooperate in establishing the right to stay in the 
country the person may be detained.369 He or she may be detained for up to 
six hours according to ch. 9 sec. 11 of the Aliens Act. This corresponds with 
the rules in the Code of Judicial Procedure. A person who is suspected of a 
crime can be detained for 12 hours, while non-suspects only can be detained 
for six (ch. 23 sec. 9 RB).   
 As to the police’s right to detain an unknown person for identification 
purposes the right to use coercive powers are significant both when it is done 
for administrative and criminal purposes.  Rules for holding a person in 
detention also corresponds when comparing the Aliens Act to the Code of 
Judicial Procedure. Legislatively the rules are equal. However, if the 
threshold for intervention is lower in migration matters than criminal matters 
as it could be due to uncertainty discussed in the previous chapter,370 the rules 
might be unequally applied in practice. 
9.2' Biometric' identifiers'and' technological'
databases'
During the last ten years a range of technological resources has increasingly 
supported internal control of foreigners. They in turn often rely on biometric 
identifiers to identify and control third-country nationals inside the Schengen 
Area. In this section I will go through the relevant tools used in internal 
control of foreigners. 
 Ch. 9 Sec. 8 b in the Aliens Act regulates collection of biometric 
identifiers in connection to an internal control. Biometric identifiers are 
fingerprints and a photograph. In the residence permit there is a storage 
medium containing the holders’ fingerprints and photograph. This can then be 
crosschecked right at the spot to control the authenticity of the document. 
After the control, the collected information should be destroyed.  
 This section was added in 2011. The residence permits now have to be 
uniform in the European Union and the provision was adopted after the 
implementation of the Council Regulation on uniform standards for residence 
permits371 in Swedish law. However, the Council Regulation does not require 
                                               
366 BERGGREN and MUNCK p. 127. 
367 BERGGREN and MUNCK p. 124 - 125. 
368 BERGGREN and MUNCK p. 127. 
369 Prop. 1988/89:86 p. 18. 
370 Ch. 8.2. 
371 EU Council Regulation (EC) No 380/2008 of 18 April 2008 amending regulation (EC) 
No 1030/2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals 
OJ L 115, 29.4.2008 p. 1 – 7.  
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this kind of control, it is a domestic initiative.372  This change represented a 
clear strengthening of the internal control. It is not enough to just have the 
residence permit, the police can instantly control if the person is who he 
claims to be. There is no discussion in the preparatory work on whether or not 
this will be perceived as a violation of integrity for the individual.  
   
In my review of preparatory works, internal control of foreigners was also 
mentioned in prop. 2014/2015:82 “Crime fighting authorities access to the 
Visa Information System (VIS)”373. VIS is the common European system for 
visa information. One of the objectives of VIS is to simplify facilitation of 
internal control of foreigners. VIS also gathers biometric identifiers of all visa 
applicants.374  VIS is not yet used in internal control of foreigners375, but there 
are huge amounts of information gathered on all visa applicant, that is ready 
to be utilized when it is deemed necessary.  
9.2.1' SIS'II'–'an'investigative'system?'
A search in SIS is conducted whenever a person is suspected to be alien 
lacking the right to stay in the country.376 It is therefore of great importance of 
the internal control of foreigners. The purpose of SIS II is “to ensure a high 
level of security within the area of freedom, security and justice of the 
European Union including the maintenance of public security and public 
policy and the safeguarding of security in the territories of the Member 
States”. It should also ensure free movement of people, services and capital 
using information communicated via this system (Art 1(2) SIS II 
Regulation377). When the idea of a common European information system 
was proposed in 1987, it was meant to register persons and goods that should 
be refused entry to the Schengen area.378 In 2001, the Council declared “the 
idea of using the SIS data for other purposes than those initially foreseen and 
specially for police information purposes in a broad sense, is now widely 
agreed upon”.379 Today, the scope of SIS has substantially expanded with no 
sign of stopping.380 In 2010, SIS contained over thirty one million records.381  
 Today there are two different legal instruments that regulate SIS 
(Schengen Information System): the SIS II Regulation and the SIS II Council 
                                               
372 Prop. 2010/11:123 p. 20. 
373 Prop. 2014/2015:82 Brottsbekämpande myndigheters tillgång till informationssystemet för 
viseringar (VIS). 
374 Prop. 2014/15:82 p. 17. 
375 Prop. 2014/15:82 p. 18. 
376 LEANDER p. 11. 
377 Regulation (EC) 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 December 2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation 
Schengen Information System (SIS II) OJ L381/4 (SIS II Regulation). 
378 BESTERS and BROM p. 457. 
379 BALZACQ p. 85. 
380 For more information read ”Greedy Information Technology: The Digitalization of the 
European Migration Police” by Besters and Brom, arguing that the European Information 
Systems information technology is ’greedy’. This means that the technical possibilities will 
determine the political goals instead of the other way around. 
381 BESTERS and BROM p. 458. 
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Decision382.  The former establishes the conditions and procedures for SIS II 
for migration purposes and the latter govern judicial and police cooperation in 
criminal matters. Despite being two separate instruments, SIS II should be 
seen as one information system operating as such.383  
 SIS II functions as a “hit/not hit”-system. You search for a person or 
an object in the database, and if there is a match, a “command” shows up. It 
can range from “apprehend this individual” or “stop this vehicle”.384 If there 
is a hit in SIS, the authority moves on to the database SIRENE 
(Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry).385 SIS would not 
function without SIRENE, which facilitates additional information, meaning 
exchange of “softer” data such as criminal intelligence information 386 
 The police and customs check have the right to search in the alert-
database directly of SIS II according to art. 40 in the SIS II Regulation. The 
categories of data that can be entered into SIS II are regulated in article 20 of 
the SIS II Regulation. Persons and missing objects can be added. The 
information on persons includes, inter alia, name, place of birth, fingerprint, 
nationality, reason for the alert, authority issuing the alert and action to be 
taken.  
9.2.2' Connection'to'crimmigration'
The involvement and use of technological databases containing biometric 
information has been a noted feature of the crimmigration trend. 387  It is 
understood as part of crimmigration because it connects two historically 
separate systems in the databases. Law enforcement agencies share their 
information with immigration enforcement agencies in order to find those 
breaking immigration laws or who are undocumented.388  
 The changed character of immigration enforcement and law 
enforcement is facilitated through the help of technology in the American 
situation. Just like here, the process of identifying if a person should be 
apprehended or not takes just a few minutes after the first contact with law 
enforcement. 389  SIS II has multiple “crimmigration”-features that overlap 
administrative law and criminal law.  
  One example is the argument made by Thierry Balzacq, Professor in 
Politics and International Relations. He argues that the fight against terrorism 
has transformed SIS from a “reporting tool” to an “investigative system”. 
Today, it holds information both of third-country nationals as well as persons 
                                               
382 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use 
of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) J L 205, 7.8.2007, p. 63–84 
(SIS II Council Decision).  
383 SIS II Council Decision preamble (4). 
384 BROEDERS p. 79. 
385 BALZACQ p. 84. 
386 BROEDERS p. 79. 
387 MCLEOD p. 123. 
388 A majority of arrestees in the country have their identifying information checked against 
the Department of Homeland Security’s database to see if the person is breaking immigration 
laws, CHACÓN, p. 645; GARCÍA, p. 1457; another example concerns the FBI’s database. 
INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) started in 2001 to add immigration violators 
into the FBI database so the FBI could instruct and advise local law enforcement to conduct 
immigration arrests, WISHNIE, p. 1086. 
389 MCLEOD p. 123. 
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wanted for criminal matters.390 Furthermore, SIS II has the capacity to hold 
information on biometric identifiers. So far, biometric identifiers can only be 
used to establish somebody’s identity after a numerical search has been 
carried out in SIS (art. 22 of the SIS II Council Decision). 
 Additionally, the European Police Office (Europol) and Eurojust391 
both have access to SIS II. Their aims clearly belong to the criminal sphere 
more than to the migration sphere. It is also possible to issue alerts for 
“discreet checks” on persons or object. This is done in order to gather 
intelligence for criminal prosecution, without the registered person’s 
knowledge.392 
 Another aspect of the digital information sharing in the area of 
migration control nexus of databases set up to control migration. As discussed 
above, VIS is one. Another is Eurodac, a system purposed to register asylum 
application in order to detect “asylum”-shopping. Eurodac and VIS both are 
equipped with fingerprint identification.393 Add to this the uniform residence 
permits that include both photographs and fingerprints for identification 
purposes.394 The idea of one shared information system where all of these 
features are combined is for now abandoned, but the European Union realize 
this ambition “by fostering synergy between the existing and future 
information systems: SIS, Eurodac, and EES395.396 
 
In criminal law, retention of fingerprints and photographs is regulated in 
Code of Judicial Procedure and therefore usually considered an investigative 
coercive measure. The ECHR has further stated that it is considered a 
violation of art. 8.397 In ch. 28 sec. 14 it says that the person who is arrested or 
detained may have his or her fingerprints taken. The provision also applies to 
others if the measure is necessary for the investigation of a crime with prison 
in the range of punishment. If the preliminary investigation is closed without 
pressing charges, the Police are obliged to excise the information of the 
suspect out of the register containing information of suspects on good 
grounds (misstankeregister). However, this is not the case if suspicion of 
good grounds still remains despite the absence of prosecution.398 This can be 
compared to SIS where records can be deleted earliest one year after they 
have been added and are taken routinely.399 
 
                                               
390 Alerts on individuals for judicial and police cooperation can be persons wanted for arrest 
and extradition purposes, (art. 26) missing persons (art. 32), persons sought to assist with 
judical procedure (art. 34) and alerts on persons ans objects for dicreet checks or specific 
checks (Art. 36 – 37). All of this is regulated in the SIS II Regulation. 
391 Eurojust is a European Union body established in 2002 to stimulate and improve the co-
ordination of investigations and prosecutions among the competent judicial authorities of the 
European Union Member States when they deal with serious cross-border and organised 
crime. 
392 Art. 36 SIS II Council Decision. 
393 BESTERS and BROM p. 456. 
394 Ch. 9.2. 
395 EES stands for ”Entry and Exit System”, meant to detect ’overstayers’. More information 
see BESTERS and BROM p. 468. 
396 BESTERS and BROM p. 469. 
397 Ch. 6.1.3. 
398 EKELÖF, BYLUND, EDELSTAM p. 153. 
399 Art. 18(3) SIS II Council Decision.  
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9.2.3' Outcomes'in'both'spheres'
Considering how SIS II conflates both migration/administrative law and 
criminal law, it is noteworthy that the search in SIS is not regulated in 
domestic law or any legal document, nor is the proportionality of its usage 
discussed. A search in SIS as part of an internal control of a foreigner is seen 
instead as a solely administrative matter. This does not take into account the 
nature of alerts in SIS, which are both administrative and criminal, as well as 
the criminalized aspect of immigration violations. A search in SIS can 
therefore have outcomes both in the criminal sphere as well as the 
administrative. In Tillsynsrapport 2014:14 SIS is discussed only in relation to 
violation of integrity, which is deemed to be minimal when no action follows.  
9.3' Controls' in' connection' to' other' police'
interventions'
The Police shall carry out internal control of foreigners in all branches of their 
work.400 One common practice is to carry out controls in connection to traffic 
controls. The right for the police to stop a car or another vehicle is regulated 
in sec. 22 of the Police Act. The Police may stop the car either because there 
is reason to assume that it is carrying someone who has committed an offense 
(subsection 1) or because it is necessary in order to control traffic or to 
perform a check of the driver of the vehicle in accordance with what is 
prescribed thereto (subsection 4). It is under subsection 4 that Police perform 
more regular controls and that internal control of foreigners are performed. 401 
The right to stop somebody in order to perform an internal control is not 
regulated in this section. The question is then whether or not this is lawful? 
SOU 2004:110 has stated that the right to control a person in connection to a 
routine control seems unclear,402 and as stated above, RPSFS 2011:4 says it 
“ought to” be lawful. The legal position seems unclear. 
 The right for the police to stop a car was not codified earlier, instead it 
was just an agreed on principle.403  One reason why it was codified was 
because when a car is stopped, the stopping restricts the freedom of 
movement for everyone in the car.404 When the provision was codified it was 
discussed if the Police should have the authority to stop a car for intelligence- 
and surveillance purposes only, without suspicion of a committed crime. It 
was decided against it because it was deemed to go too far to allow the use of 
coercive powers at such an early stage.405 Coercive powers cannot be used for 
any other purpose than what is stated in the law. However, excess information 
found through a lawful intervention has been accepted in the Swedish 
system.406  
   
                                               
400 Sec 4. RPSFS 2011:4 FAP 273-1. 
401 SOU 2004:110 p. 145. 
402 SOU 2004:110 p. 126. 
403 ”I sakens natur. 
404 BERGGREN and MUNCK p. 169. 
405 BERGGREN and MUNCK p. 169. 
406 Chapter 6.3.1.2 
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Justitieombudsmannen has not critiqued the practice of carrying out controls 
in connection to other police interventions for investigative purposes. JO dealt 
with a matter concerning internal control of foreigners in 1981. An internal 
control was initiated during a house search of a club because of suspicion of 
criminal activity. The instructions from the Police Board (then RPS 1981:6 
FAP 273-1) stated that when performing traffic controls and controls of clubs 
with suspected criminal activity, an internal control should be conducted as 
well. JO said that he had nothing to object to conducting an internal control of 
foreigners together with a house search in accordance with the instructions.407 
No further measures were taken in the matter.   
9.3.1' Principle'of'purpose'
Should the practice of performing controls in relation to traffic controls be 
understood as violation the principle of purpose? If a control is carried out 
because the driver is driving carelessly and the Police then discover that they 
have reason to assume that he or she lacks the right to stay in the country, this 
would probably be allowed. However, it can be questioned if it would be a 
violation of the principle of purpose if an officer’s target a specific driver 
because they have a foreign appearance. The problem is that we cannot know 
what comes first. Furthermore, there is no discussion relating to if this 
implementation is legally correct or not. Probably because the outcomes 
belong to the administrative sphere and not the criminal.  
9.4' Concluding'remarks'
One of my research questions is if enforcement of immigration law relies on 
the criminal justice system. I would say that the migration control system 
make use of traditionally “criminal” tools and techniques, such as detention, 
biometric identifiers, house searches and databases with automatic 
processing. Internal control of foreigner also makes use of the Police’s 
authority on other areas to enable interventions. Because these measures are 
considered to be only administrative there is however little discussion 
regarding their legality. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
407 Justitieombudsmannen dnr. 477-1982. 
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10' Final'Conclusion'
10.1' Is'internal'control'of'foreigners'part'of'
the'crimmigration^trend?'
In order for a merger of two areas of law to be significant, they have to be 
seen as distinct at some point. Therefore, I looked at the potential 
criminal/administrative divide in Swedish law in chapter three. Despite the 
fact that the divide is not as clear as it has been in the American legal setting, 
there is a difference between the two areas. The distinguishing feature is that 
the outcomes are viewed so differently. Criminal punishment is seen as 
repressive, while administrative decisions that are materially correct 
represents the “ideal outcome”. This view also affects the procedural rules in 
each area. 
 
Kanstroom argues that when the mere presence of an undocumented migrant 
is criminalized this indicates “a nearly complete merger between the criminal 
and civil immigration control system”.408 This is the reality of the Swedish 
system and has been for almost 90 years. In this instance, the Swedish legal 
system shows clear signs of crimmigration. Internal control of foreigners can 
then be understood either as a criminal investigation tool or as an 
administrative measure. Traditionally, it has been understood as an 
administrative measure. This has effects on the rules relevant for the actors 
enforcing the controls and what tools can be used.  
 In this essay I have looked at the controls through various angles and 
tried to discern a possible crimmigration-connection. One of the relevant 
angles is the prosecution rate. In contrast to the United States, the prosecution 
rate regarding immigration violations are very low. If the prosecution rate 
would increase, I would argue that it would change the character of the 
controls, because a control is a condition for a discovery of an unauthorized 
immigrant. If the outcomes of the controls predominantly end up in the 
criminal sphere there are substantial reasons to start rethinking the control’s 
place in the administrative/criminal divide. With this, procedural safeguards 
and clearer legislation should follow. So far, this is not the case. 
 
The intertwinement of law enforcement agencies and immigration 
enforcement agencies are one feature of the crimmigration trend. In the fourth 
chapter I discussed how the main actor, the Police, always have been active in 
migration control. Furthermore, the Police Authority’s duty is to carry out 
both migration control in the form of internal control of foreigners and to 
prevent crime. In this regard the Actor, the Police, belongs in both spheres 
and has done so for quite some time.  
 What is a new phenomenon however, is the increased importance and 
intensification of the controls that I described in chapter seven. This increased 
need for controls is in large attributed to Sweden’s accession of the Schengen 
Agreement. The fundamental principles of the Schengen Agreement consist 
                                               
408 KANSTROOM p. 656. 
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of a combination of crime control and immigration control. One could 
imagine that if the premises for the Schengen Agreement were different, the 
adopted technique to battle “illegal immigration” would look different. 
Instead of turning to the criminal system for help with migration control, 
some other actor in society might have been engaged. In this regard, I would 
argue that there are signs of crimmigration. 
 A clearer sign of crimmigration is the reasoning found in SOU 
2002:69, SOU 2004:110 and prop. 2012/13:125 where internal control of 
foreigners are distinctly linked to crime control. Neither SOU 2002:69 nor 
SOU 2004:110 led to any legal changes and it can be discussed what legal 
relevance these documents have. Prop. 2012/13:125 however both lowered 
the threshold for controls as well as underlined the controls importance in 
fighting unauthorized work. If this is telling for the legal development that is 
to come, it is very troubling from a crimmigration standpoint. 
 
Crimmigration-literature specifically emphasizes two divisions as the most 
relevant in the making of crimmigration. The first is the citizen/non-citizen 
divide, and the second is the administrative/criminal divide. In Sweden, these 
two divisions influence the potential legislation and implementation. As I 
discussed in the sixth chapter, there is a far reaching right for the legislator to 
distinguish between citizens and non-citizens. Internal control of foreigners 
only applies to non-citizens. This means that non-citizens are the only ones 
who can be subject to it and the accompanying control-and coercive 
measures.  
 There are also more rules governing police work in relation for 
investigative duties than it is for administrative. For example, coercive 
powers put the prosecution at a much more powerful position than the 
defense, but procedural safeguards try to balance this inequality. The use of 
coercive measures in the migration sphere does not invoke the same amount 
of discussion on legal security. Especially when it comes to the use of 
biometric identifiers it is clear that the controls are seen as administrative 
measures and not investigative. In this regard it is obvious that the need for 
enforcement is so grand, that far-reaching surveillance is accepted, despite the 
fact that it can be argued that it violates the protection of integrity in art. 8 
ECHR and ch. 2 sec. 6 of the IoG. Furthermore, seeing these checks as purely 
administrative does not acknowledge how these databases store both criminal 
information as well as migration information. This considered, there are clear 
signs of crimmigration tendencies relating to relaxed procedural safeguards 
because of the measures perceived administrative nature. 
 Another example of this is the practice of carrying out controls in 
connection to other police interventions. The example I have discussed 
mostly in this essay is in connection to traffic control, but I also touched upon 
the usage of controls in connection to house searches with investigative 
purposes. The principle of purpose is not discussed in legal instruments or 
JO-decisions. I would argue that a partial explanation for this is the 
administrative nature of the controls. 
 
Internal control of foreigners per se is not part of the crimmigration-trend. It 
has been part of the migration control policy for a long time, always carried 
out by the Police. However, there are aspects of the control that carry clear 
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hallmarks of crimmigration. The fact that unauthorized presence is 
criminalized is one, opening up for the criminal sphere to intervene. Another 
hallmark is that the controls are meant to hinder both unauthorized 
immigration as well as crime. A third is that the administrative nature of the 
controls lessens the scrutiny given to tools used to carry out the controls, 
despite their clear resemblance with investigative counterparts. 
10.2' What' can' the' crimmigration^literature'
bring' to' the' Swedish' discussion' on'
internal'control'of'foreigners?''
The most significant contribution is how crimmigration highlights how 
administrative law and criminal law are seen as two distinct areas of law, and 
how this in turn affects the rules in the two areas. This is very apparent in my 
essay, where I have focused on this divide and the results of it from start to 
finish. I think that this is a new way of looking at the legislation that captures 
aspects that are rarely highlighted. In the next sections I will comment on 
some specific details that I find interesting. 
10.2.1' 'Criminal'law'as'a'migration'control'tool'
One aspect of ”crimmigration” is how criminal law is used as a migration 
control tool. This can be achieved through criminalizing immigration 
violations and prosecute these crimes. In the Swedish context, the prosecution 
rate is relatively low to the number of controls that are performed. Another 
way to use criminal law as a tool for migration control is to adopt migration 
control in all Police interventions, which has been done. The crimmigration-
literature has critiqued this development on mainly two grounds. Firstly, it 
will deter undocumented immigrants from reporting crime and co-operating 
with local police. This is probably not perceived as problem in Sweden today 
because undocumented immigrants still hold a very secluded position in 
society. A second critique is that it misguides crime control, as expressed by 
McLeod. Law enforcement will focus less on who is actually a dangerous 
individual and implement the dual objectives of crime control and migration 
control in their daily work. Furthermore, it drastically increases the risk of 
racial profiling. In Texas, where ICE implemented immigration screening as 
part of law enforcement discretionary, arrests of Latinos for minor crimes 
increased drastically. 409  This kind of policies lead to adverse impact on 
people perceived as foreigners regardless of their actual legal status. The two 
concerns addressed by crimmigration-scholars deserve to be acknowledged 
by Swedish legislators as well. 
10.2.2' Ad^hoc'instrumentalism'
The prosecutor is left with the discretion whether or not to prosecute in 
relation to crimes against unauthorized stay, ch. 1 sec. 1 of the Aliens Act. 
The prosecutor may then invoke whatever legal sphere he or she deems most 
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advantageous.  The same is true when the controls are regarded as a crime-
fighting tool and can be deployed as such when it is “suitable”. This is what 
Sklansky would call “tailored enforcement”, 410  connected to ad-hoc 
instrumentalism. Ad-hoc instrumentalism is made possible through the vague 
shaping of the provision that regulates internal control of foreigners. This 
leaves room for major discretion for front line officials, such as prosecutors 
and law enforcement officials. The legislator has accepted this vagueness, and 
I would even argue that it has been utilized. The most obvious example is 
prop. 2012/13:125 that lowered the threshold for controls. Because there is no 
real discussion on how “reason to assume” and “otherwise special control” 
should be interpreted it is hard to argue that this interpretation is completely 
incorrect. 
 This vagueness and possible lowering of the threshold can be 
connected to what Eagly describes as broadening of the law. The broadening 
of the substance in immigration law and criminal law affect the outcomes in 
both. When the threshold for interventions is set lower in the immigration 
sphere, it can be utilized in the immigration sphere. As Sklansky notes, it may 
undermine the rule of law.  
10.3' Personal'reflections'
I will end with some remarks that are a little bit outside of the purpose of my 
essay. I think one reason why the United States have chosen this path of 
immigration control is because undocumented immigrants have a relatively 
strong position in the United States. Their contribution to the economy is at 
large recognized. To justify immigration control, they have turned to criminal 
law to designate who is an outsider, and who is an insider. When I studied at 
University of California, Berkeley, I had a good friend who was 
undocumented. She attended one of the nation’s top schools, without legal 
status. The Swedish environment is different. Undocumented immigrants are 
not a part of society as they are in the United States, at least not yet. A 
personal number is still required to take part in society at large.  
 
 A comparison between the two countries can be made in regard to the recent 
decision to ensure all undocumented children in Sweden K-12 education. This 
was done in the United States in 1982 through the Supreme Court decision 
Plyler v. Doe. Furthermore, in the United States, it is recognized that you 
form ties to a country if you are there long enough regardless of your legal 
status. In Sweden, time you spent in the country irregularly is not taken into 
account when linkage to the country is assessed. These are some examples of 
the differences and the view of undocumented immigrants. 
 
Swedish migration policy will change during the next years. In large, it will 
have to because we will see new forms of migration, with new labor 
migration policies and the European Union, migrants outside and in the 
outskirts of society will increase. The question is how Sweden will handle 
this change. I very much hope that it will not turn to criminal law, and that the 
United States can be a warning example.  
                                               
410 SKLANSKY p. 209. 
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